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1. MONETARY POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS – KEY 
FINDINGS OF A CONFERENCE JOINTLY 
ORGANISED BY SUERF AND THE NATIONAL 
BANK OF POLAND IN WARSAW ON 4 MARCH 
2011
Ernest Gnan, Ryszard Kokoszczynski, Tomasz Łyziak & 
Robert McCauley
On 4 March 2011, SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum and the
National Bank of Poland jointly organised a conference on the theme of:
“Monetary Policy after the Crisis”. Following a call for papers with a large
number of submissions, the scientific committee1 selected 9 papers, which were
grouped in three sessions addressing the following three research questions: First,
what have we learnt from the crisis for the conduct of monetary policy? Second,
what have we learnt from the crisis for the coordination of monetary, fiscal and
macroprudential policies. And third, how did the Monetary Transmission Mech-
anism during the crisis function, and what can we expect for the future?
Governor Marek Belka, National Bank of Poland, opened the conference with a
number of pointed observations, with his opening remarks following in the next
chapter of this SUERF Study. Inflation targeting served Poland well. It stabilised
inflation and inflation expectations. Poland’s version of inflation targeting with a
flexible exchange rate policy also helped the country to weather the crisis well.
So, there is no need to change the policy in Poland. But this may be different for
other countries: Inflation targeting neglected asset price developments, so in this
sense it failed, given that the crisis was provoked by asset price bubbles.
Against this background, the Governor raised a number of important issues: Did
monetary policy contribute to the crisis? How important was the “Greenspan
put”? Was it a necessary but not sufficient cause, or was it THE main engine of
the crisis? Will inflation targeting survive the crisis, will it be modified, and how?
Can inflation help reduce public debt problems in advanced countries? How can
Poland conduct its monetary policy well if monetary transmission is impaired by
international spillovers? And how can the monetary policy mandate be squared
1 The scientific committee comprised Ernest Gnan, SUERF and Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Ryszard
Kokoszczynski, SUERF and National Bank of Poland, Tomasz Łyziak, National Bank of Poland, and Robert
McCauley, SUERF and Bank for International Settlements.
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with new financial stability concerns which have moved into the forefront since
the crisis?
Governor Belka expressed concern about bringing financial stability into the cen-
tral bank’s mandate. Financial stability policy can only work well if used early on,
in this case it can support and reinforce monetary policy. Poland is currently in
such a phase, imbalances have not yet built up. So, in this phase, supervisory and
regulatory instruments can be employed usefully to make monetary policy more
efficient and less costly.
Catherine Lubochinsky, President of SUERF, thanked the National Bank of
Poland for hosting the conference, the scientific committee for putting together
an interesting programme, and all speakers and the audience for participating. At
the current juncture, monetary policy is still in crisis mode, but is at the same time
concerned with how to design the new norm after the crisis. Despite being very
inventive in designing new, unconventional monetary policy instruments, central
banks now have too many objectives with too few instruments: they set interest
rates, manage the exchange rate, act as market makers, and are supposed to
supervise and control commercial banks and financial markets. It is interesting to
note though, that various countries and central banks have recently moved in
differing directions with respect to central banks’ responsibilities in banking reg-
ulation and supervision.
The first keynote speech was given by Jens Thomsen, former Vice-Governor Dan-
marks National Bank, on the topic “Monetary Policy after the Crisis – Ten Les-
sons from a Fixed-Exchange-Rate Regime”, and co-authored by Kim Abildgren,
and which appears as Chapter 3 of this SUERF Study. The Danish Krone has been
held stable against the Deutsch Mark, and later the Euro, since 1987. Initially the
exchange rate policy was supported by capital restrictions, which were, however,
circumvented. Denmark is not a member of the euro area because a majority of
the Danes voted no to the proposal of replacing the krone with the euro in a
referendum in 2000. Inflation has been around 2% since 1990, exchange rate
interventions have regularly been used to implement the exchange rate policy; in
addition interest rates were used in specific situations of market nervousness to
support the exchange rate peg. Economic fundamentals and bond yield spreads
have compared favorably with other Nordic countries over the past two decades.
The Danish experience implies ten lessons: First, foreign exchange intervention is
useful up to a certain point; in times of severe pressure, the interest rate needs to
be used to support the peg. Second, the interest sensitivity of portfolio capital
flows is regime dependent. During financial turmoil interest-rate sensitivity of
capital flows can decline substantially. Third, the size of foreign reserves plays an
important role in signalling commitment to a fixed-exchange-rate regime during
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periods of foreign exchange rate turmoil. Fourth, the proper interest-rate
response during crises is rarely convenient and popular. Fifth, when they are
needed the most, foreign exchange reserves can be most difficult to obtain. Sixth,
the cost of holding foreign reserves are low when the reserves are not needed
(calm markets) and expensive when they are needed (currency turmoil). Seventh,
swap arrangements between central banks during the crisis were successful.
Eighth, the operational frameworks for monetary policy implementation must be
sufficiently flexible to address extraordinary liquidity situations in the money
market. Ninth, short-term financing through money and capital markets is more
sensitive to banks’ creditworthiness than deposits. Banks’ dependence on money
market financing thus makes them more vulnerable, also to spill-overs from
banking problems in other countries. If the banking system relies heavily on
short-term foreign funding, this can have systemic implications and make it nec-
essary for the central bank to operate with large foreign-exchange reserves.
Finally, there is a cost to Denmark of not joining the euro area; this cost is most
visible during crises.
Claudio Borio, Bank for International Settlements, addressed the issue of “Cen-
tral Banking Post-Crisis: What Compass for Unchartered Waters”2. Are central
bankers the great winners of the crisis? They are seen to have saved the financial
system. Beneath the surface, the picture is less reassuring: pre-crisis monetary
policy certainties have gone. The line between fiscal and monetary policy has
become blurred. Even the ability to control inflation has been questioned. Three
challenges lie ahead: first, regarding the economic outlook, there are long-lasting
scars of the crisis and signs of unsustainable booms in emerging markets; second,
at an intellectual level, the benchmark analytical frameworks have failed; third,
at an institutional level, central bank independence has become blurred and is
under threat.
The pre-crisis consensus was that price stability is sufficient for macroeconomic
stability – this was the intellectual basis for inflation targeting. Analytically, this
was supported by the New-Keynesian paradigm, where price rigidities were the
only frictions in the economy. There was also a clear separation between mone-
tary and financial stability functions (except for the lender of last resort in crisis
management). The short-term interest rate was seen to be sufficient to capture the
impact of monetary policy on the economy, assuming perfect substitutability
across asset classes and little perceived risk of the zero lower bound. Finally, the
assumption was that if each central bank looked after its own economy, the glo-
bal monetary policy stance would turn out to be appropriate, too. This was
equivalent to the microprudential approach to regulation and supervision.
2 C. BORIO, “Central banking post-crisis: What compass for uncharted waters?” (forthcoming in C. JONES &
R. PRINGLE (eds.), The Future of Central Banking, Central Banking Publications, 2011.
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The new post-crisis consensus is that low and stable inflation does not guarantee
financial and macroeconomic stability. Cleaning up the debris through monetary
policy is costly and interest rate policy is not enough. There is a need to shift from
a purely micro to a macroprudential orientation in regulation and supervision,
with a key role for central banks. But there are also areas of disagreement: Should
monetary policy seek to lean against financial imbalances even if consumer price
inflation is low and stable? How serious is the collateral damage of extraordinar-
ily accommodative monetary policy (interest rate and balance sheet policies) in
the wake of a crisis?
For his further analysis, Borio used three working hypotheses: First, monetary
policy contributed significantly to the crisis by supporting the build-up of finan-
cial imbalances through low interest rates and the resulting increased risk-taking.
Second, the aggressive and prolonged easing after the crisis has serious limita-
tions: potential output has been permanently lost, and by now is potentially over-
estimated. The still existing private debt overhang may be aggravated by heavy
public borrowing. Monetary policy easing delays necessary structural adjust-
ments, raises financial stability risks and can compromise central bank independ-
ence. High public debt will raise pressure on central banks to inflate. Inflation
may become to be seen as a solution rather than a problem. By purchasing large
sums of private and public debt, central banks have become subject to huge
potential losses, which may pose public and political pressure on them (see the
current discussion about the large losses of the Swiss National Bank). Third,
keeping one’s own house in order is not enough: Floating exchange rates provide
only limited insulation. There is a tendency to underestimate the role of global
factors. This is not merely a question of spillovers, it is also the result of parallel
policies which in the aggregate lead to unsustainable global results (e.g. global
energy and food prices, very low interest rates in many countries prior to, and
also now after the crisis).
Four implications follow from the above: First, to constrain the build up of finan-
cial imbalances needs to be done by macroprudential policies and monetary pol-
icies together. Second, monetary policy needed to be aggressive during crisis man-
agement but now the structural repair of balance sheets should take over as the
key priority. There is an urgent need to strengthen CBI – this is also critical for
macroprudential policies. Fourth, we need to find ways to internalise spillover
effects of individual central bank policies and their contributions to global mon-
etary conditions.
In conclusion, Borio pleaded for a change in macroeconomic paradigms. It is not
adequate to explain monetary phenomena with basically real economic models
(possibly supplemented with some additional financial frictions). Instead, the old
monetary economics traditions following Wicksell should be rediscovered. The
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fortunes of central banking have shifted over time: After Arthur Burns’ “anguish
of central banking”, followed by Paul Volcker’s “triumph of central banking” we
nowadays have to cope with “the doubts of central banking”. Particularly in a
time of broadened responsibilities and more fragile central bank balance sheets,
the crucial role of central bank independence needs to be emphasized, while at the
same time the limitations of what central banks can achieve with monetary and
macroprudential policies need to be recognized. The global dimension of central
banks’ tasks needs to be more explicitly and fully recognized.
Session 1, chaired by Ernest Gnan, SUERF and Oesterreichische Nationalbank,
addressed the issue of “Conducting monetary policy – what have we learnt from
the crisis?”.
Charles Brendon, Exeter College, Oxford, presented a paper on “Optimal con-
ventional and unconventional monetary policy in the presence of collateral con-
straints and the zero bound”, co-authored by Matthias Paustian and Tony Yates.
Using a sticky price business cycle model with collateral constrained entrepre-
neurs, the authors investigate how optimal monetary policy is affected by the
presence of the zero lower bound to official interest rates. They also study the
advantages of employing a second, unconventional monetary policy instrument
such as “credit easing” and investigate the welfare differences between commit-
ment and discretion. They find that using the unconventional monetary policy
instrument improves welfare, because it helps relax the borrowing constraint.
The model also illustrates that in a crisis commitment by the central bank to a
future path of interest rates can improve welfare (as compared to discretionary
policy without clear guidance on future policy), particularly if official interest
rates have reached the zero lower bound: announcing the future path of policy
rates, by managing the yield curve, in a way compensates for not being able to
further cut short-term spot money market rates. If no such commitment is possi-
ble, the costs of non-commitment are shown to be reduced by the credit-easing
instrument, both in case the zero lower bound has been reached and if interest
rates are still above the lower bound. Thus, in a crisis such as the most recent one,
in a sense the unconventional monetary policy instrument helped to make up for
the disadvantages of discretionary policy at the zero lower bound.
Patrizio Pagano, Bank of Italy, addressed “The Role of Macroeconomic Policies
in the Global Crisis” co-authored by Pietro Catte, Pietro Cova, and Ignazio Visco,
with a shorter paper, “Macroeconomic Policies and the Roots of the Global
Crisis” included in this SUERF Study as Chapter 4. Using NiGEM, a commer-
cially available large global Neo-Keynesian (forward-looking agents, nominal
rigidities) macro-economic model, the authors conduct simulations to answer the
following questions: First, was US monetary policy too lax for too long after the
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2001 recession? Could tighter policy have prevented or contained the housing
bubble? Second, would stricter supervision and/or macro-prudential policies via
higher credit costs have prevented/contained the bubble? Third, would a combi-
nation of these policies have helped to contain the bubble and US current account
deficits? Fourth, would stronger potential growth in Europe and Japan and more
reliance on domestic demand in China, have helped to contain the build up of
global imbalances? The authors find that the combination of all these measures,
while substantially dampening growth initially in the US, would also have at least
mitigated the following Great Recession. All in all, the net effect of the alternative
policy path would have been clearly positive; so, restrictive policies during the
build up of the crisis could be regarded as an insurance premium well worth
paying to avoid the much greater damage later on. It is worrying that the funda-
mental macroeconomic imbalances that were at the root of the recent crisis have
not been removed by the Great Recession; so, the need for a coordinated effort to
establish a more sustainable pattern of global growth remains.
Roman Horváth, Charles University of Prague, investigated the question “How
Does Monetary Policy Respond to Financial Stress?” in a paper co-authored by
Jaromír Baxa and Bořek Vašíček. Using data for the US, UK, Australia, Canada
and Sweden over the past three decades, the authors investigate whether and how
central banks reacted to financial instability in their interest rate policy, and
which type of instability they responded to most strongly. To this end, they esti-
mate monetary policy rules employing a novel time-varying parameter model
with endogenous regressors and using comprehensive measures of financial stress
developed by the IMF. The paper confirms that central banks loosen interest rates
in the face of high financial stress, financial stress explains 10-50 percent of inter-
est rate variations during the 2008-2009 crisis. Bank stress and stock market
stress were empirically the dominant forms of financial stress triggering interest
rate cuts, exchange rate stress was more important in more open economies. The
recent crisis was unique in the sense that interest responses were highly synchro-
nised across central banks, the response was substantial but in some countries
similar to previous episodes of idiosyncratic financial stress.
Session  2, chaired by Ryszard Kokoszczynski, SUERF and National Bank of
Poland, was devoted to the issue of “Coordination of monetary, fiscal and mac-
roprudential policies – what have we learnt from the crisis?”
In the first paper, Petar Chobanov, University of National and World Economy
in Sofia, investigated “Money Market Integration and Sovereign CDS Spreads
Dynamics in the New EU States”, co-authored by Amine Lahiani and Nikolay
Nenosky, which appears in this SUERF Study as Chapter 5. Using high frequency
panel data, the paper confirms for the eight new EU member states a link between
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expectations about the condition of public finances (as approximated by sover-
eign CDS spreads) and liquidity risk (as measured by short-term money market
rates). The crisis has changed the relationship between liquidity and fiscal risk,
with interesting differences across countries depending on their exchange-rate/
monetary policy strategies. Countries with a currency board show a significant
link between CDS spreads and money market rates. Thus, fixed exchange rate
regimes are apparently perceived as riskier when resorting to macroeconomic pol-
icies to cope with external shocks. By contrast, in inflation targeting countries,
during the crisis the link between monetary and fiscal risk became weaker and
insignificant, while spill-overs from euro area benchmark variables became sig-
nificant.
Cristina Badarau, University Montesquieu Bordeaux 4, studied “Which policy-
mix to mitigate the effects of financial heterogeneity in a monetary union” such
as the euro area, co-authored by Grégory Levieuge, from which a shorter policy
paper entitled “Financial asymmetries, national divergences and macroeconomic
policy in a monetary union” appears in this Study as Chapter 6. Using a cali-
brated DSGE model with a heterogeneous bank capital channel, with financial
shocks in addition to monetary policy, fiscal policy and technological shocks, the
paper shows that a single monetary policy in a heterogeneous monetary union
can worsen national divergencies. The authors conclude, among other things,
that decentralized fiscal policies need to be more active in countries more sensitive
to shocks, i.e. where the bank capital channel is stronger, to mitigate adverse
asymmetric shocks. If structural heterogeneity is important, fiscal policy coordi-
nation can lead to less macroeconomic stabilisation at the individual national
level, but it may reduce public spending divergence. During the financial crisis, a
cooperative fiscal policy regime would, according to the authors, have entailed
insufficient national policy reaction.
Marco Lo Duca, European Central Bank, presented a paper on “Risk, Uncer-
tainty and Monetary Policy”, co-authored by Gert Bekaert and Marie Hoerova.
The paper starts from the frequently alleged link between loose monetary policy
and excessive risk-taking in financial markets, and documents a strong correla-
tion between the level of monetary policy rates and financial markets’ risk aver-
sion, as measured by stock market option-based implied volatility. Decomposing
implied volatility into two components, risk aversion and uncertainty, and using
a structural vector autoregressive methodology, the authors find interactions
between each of the components and monetary policy to be rather different.
Loose monetary policy increases risk appetite in the future, with the effect start-
ing to become significant after five months and lasting about two years. At the
same time, monetary policy is found to react to periods of high uncertainty by
easing interest rates. The policy conclusions are potentially powerful: If monetary
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policy significantly affects risk appetite in asset markets, monetary policy may
turn out to be sufficiently potent to stop financial excesses. Conversely, in periods
of crisis, when financial markets are “fearful”, loose monetary policy may play a
useful role in reducing these fears.
Session 3, chaired by Urs Birchler, SUERF and University of Zurich, was con-
cerned with “The Monetary Transmission Mechanism During and After the
Crisis”.
Wayne Passmore, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, studied the ques-
tion: “Did the Federal Reserve’s MBS Purchase Program Lower Mortgage
Rates?” in a paper co-authored by Diana Hancock. On 25 November 2008, the
Federal Reserve announced that it would purchase USD 500bn of agency mort-
gage backed securities (issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae)
over the next 16 months, in order to reduce the cost and increase the availability
of credit for the purchases of houses. Using an empirical pricing model for mort-
gage backed securities yields and mortgage rates, the authors find that the
announcement of the programme, by signalling strong and credible government
backing for mortgage markets and the financial system as a whole, already
reduced mortgage rates by 85 basis points by end-2008, although by that time no
mortgage backed securities had yet actually been purchased. All in all, rates were
lowered by 100-150 basis points. By end-May 2009, normal pricing conditions
had returned to US primary and secondary mortgage markets. The successful
reduction in rates may be attributed equally to two effects: first, improved market
functioning due to clear government backing, and second, portfolio rebalancing
effects. After the Fed’s intervention had ended, portfolio rebalancing effects were
experienced due to the permanent reduction in the stock of mortgage bonds avail-
able on the market. In summary, the authors conclude that the purchases were
effective.
Ewa Wróbel, National Bank of Poland, presented a paper on “Monetary Policy
Transmission Disturbances During the Financial Crisis: a Case of an Emerging
Market Economy”, co-authored by Tomasz Łyziak, Jan Przystupa and Ewa Sta-
nisławska with a shorter version of this paper, “The Impact of the Financial Crisis
on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism: the Case of Poland” appearing in this
SUERF Study as Chapter 7. Using the case study of Poland, an inflation-targeting
economy, the paper shows that the financial crisis affects monetary policy trans-
mission through both a crisis-induced change in monetary policy and changes in
the structural features of the economy. Against the risk of a deep decline in out-
put, the central bank increased its responsiveness to both inflation and output
shocks, thus taking into account disturbances in interest rate pass through to
money market and retail rates, as well as in the credit channel. All in all, the
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authors concluded that disturbances in monetary policy transmission rather
reflected increased perception of risk and cyclical factors triggered by the finan-
cial crisis and to a lesser extent structural changes in the economy. However, in a
medium-term perspective, the magnitude and duration of the crisis, combined
with ongoing changes in the regulatory framework and macroeconomic policies,
may, through learning by agents, trigger lasting changes also in monetary trans-
mission.
Urszula Szczerbowicz, LUISS Guido Carli and Sciences Po-OFCE, investigated
“Are Unconventional Monetary Policies Effective?”, with a shorter version
“Effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies and their impact on long-
term inflation expectations” being included in this SUERF Study as Chapter 8.
The paper evaluates the impact of non-conventional monetary policies on the
Libor-OIS spread, long-term interest rates and long-term inflation expectations in
the United States by studying the behaviour of selected asset yields on the days of
policy statements. The author confirms that announcements of government bail-
outs and recapitalisations and liquidity facilities other than the TAF reduced the
3-month Libor-OIS spread by an estimated 25 and 9 basis points respectively. The
long-term Treasury securities purchases as well as the outright purchases of
Agency debt and mortgage-backed securities in the context of “Quantitative Eas-
ing 1” lowered long-term interest rates by 17 and 22 basis points respectively.
Finally, the Fed’s rescue operations of several large financial institutions, “Quan-
titative Easing 2” and fiscal stimulus announcements raised long-term inflation
expectations by 5-6 basis points.

The around 130 conference participants bore witness to the timeliness and prac-
tical relevance of the issues raised in the conference program. Various central
banks around the world have switched back from crisis mode into the “new nor-
mal”, and also the European Central Bank had, on the day preceding the confer-
ence, indicated that a hike in official interest rates, after two years of historically
low levels, might be imminent. At a deeper, more structural level, the crisis has
triggered critical thinking on how to better capture financial friction and the
monetary sector in economic models, how to modify monetary policy strategies
to make them more robust against the build up of macroeconomic and financial
imbalances, and on the role of central banks in areas outside of monetary policy,
such as macro-prudential surveillance. While of course, in just one day, these
complex questions could only be touched upon, the conference offered a good
overview of the issues at stake and on the ongoing research in this field in
academia and at central banks around the world. SUERF will certainly follow
these issues up at future events.





The issue is extremely topical and I wish to go beyond the usual courtesy and say
that we are looking forward to the conclusions, suggestions, remarks and discus-
sion arising from today’s conference which will hopefully make our job, that of
conducting monetary policy in a small open economy, a little bit easier. Our small
open economy is one that is fully integrated with the rest of the European econ-
omy, apart from the fact that we do not use the common currency adopted in the
rest of the European economy. Apart from having a separate currency, all other
features of our monetary policy are common to those of the rest of Europe,
although this does, however, make it difficult on occasions – particularly in tur-
bulent times – to conduct monetary policy. Having looked at the programme, I
am particularly interested in the keynote speech to be given by Jens Thomsen
from Danmarks Nationalbank, outlining some “Lessons from a Fixed-Exchange-
Rate Regime”, since the lessons from Denmark’s experience could also be of par-
ticular relevance to Poland.
I now wish to reflect on a couple of further issues that are due to be discussed
today, which are of great importance for Poland.
Inflation targeting has served Poland quite well, but it is necessary to look beyond
our own boundaries to examine whether Inflation Targeting, adopted officially
or only in practice, has been beneficial for economies that adopted this strategy.
Inflation Targeting did not cover asset prices, and therefore was not entirely rel-
evant, since the crisis was started by asset price bubbles. We can also ask whether
monetary policy contributed to the crisis or was it one of the main causes if not
the main cause behind the crisis? How important was the famous Greenspan Put
as a cause? Was it just one of the necessary but not sufficient causes of the crisis
or was it the main engine of the crisis? Its role in the crisis leads us to ask whether
inflation targeting will survive the crisis – and if so, in its current form or in a
modified form? In Poland’s case, it has served us well over the last decade, and
helped us to stabilise price levels and expectations, which is not easy in a country
with an inflationary record like Poland’s. The version of inflation targeting that
Poland deployed, was one of inflation targeting with a flexible exchange-rate,
which has also been quoted as being one of the factors that allowed us to come
through the crisis in a reasonable shape. For us there is no reason to place doubt
upon the benefits of inflation targeting, but this might not be the case with other
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countries. The question arises of how can we continue with this policy in a world
where quantitative easing is the issue of the day, and in which we suspect that
inflation might be the way to get rid of, or at least attenuate the problems faced
by advanced countries. This leads us to ask how we can conduct our monetary
policy, knowing that the financial integration of our country with others basically
impairs the monetary transmission mechanism of our monetary policy.
A second question, which of course will be debated here as it is everywhere, is the
link between monetary policy and financial stability policy/issue. In fact financial
stability is part of the mandate of central banks almost everywhere, but has not
always necessarily been treated as seriously as it should have been. Now, when
we look back to the Great Moderation the question arises of whether monetary
policy could have prevented the crisis or made it less disruptive, and in this regard
I have already mentioned the famous Greenspan Put. There are many that think
that the two dimensions of the central bank’s mandate – of price stability and
financial stability – conflict with each other in conditions prevailing at certain
moments. I must say, however, that I am very comfortable with the fact that finan-
cial stability has become a well-defined and prominent part of our mandate.
However, we have to remember that – like with fiscal policy – good financial
stability policy is only possible in good times. I sometimes say that fiscal policy is
bad in bad times, with good fiscal policy only possible to be initiated in good
times. The same applies to financial stability policy, if you use instruments which
you have only in the early phase of the cycle when the imbalances only start
building up, then this can be a very helpful measure that reinforces monetary
policy. We feel that we are currently in this phase of the cycle – the economy is
growing, imbalances have yet to start building up and we are able to start using
macroprudential and microprudential instruments, and supervisory and regula-
tory instruments can be used at an early phase of the cycle, which I think makes
monetary policy more efficient, less costly, and makes the life of a central bank
slightly less uncomfortable.
I cannot pretend, in conclusion, to have addressed all the issues of substance sur-
rounding monetary policy, but these issues that I have highlighted are the ones
that affect us here in the National Bank of Poland and if, which is certain, we hear
and experience a good discussion here today, I am sure that this will be a very
helpful event. Thank you very much.
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3. MONETARY POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS – 
TEN LESSONS FROM A FIXED-EXCHANGE-RATE 
REGIME
Jens Thomsen1 and Kim Abildgren2
3.1. A SHORT REVIEW OF THE RULES OF THE GAME IN 
A FIXED EXCHANGE-RATE REGIME
Although there is a high degree of consensus in terms of monetary-policy objec-
tives (price stability) and instruments (the short-term interest rate), central banks
still apply different strategies and approaches in implementation of monetary pol-
icy.
Denmark has conducted a fixed-exchange-rate policy since the 1980s, with
adjustments until 1987, cf. Chart 1 and 2. Several other small European countries
also pursued a fixed-exchange-rate strategy in the 1980s and the early 1990s but
have since then opted for regimes based on explicit inflation targets or joined the
euro area. Due to the fixed-exchange-rate policy, the Danish monetary policy is
aimed at keeping the krone stable against the euro within the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism, ERM. The main objective of monetary policy in the euro area
is to maintain an inflation rate of below, but close to, 2 per cent. Linking the
Danish krone to the euro creates a basis for achieving the same level of inflation
and inflation expectations in Denmark as in the euro area, cf. Chart 3.
A few words should be given regarding Denmark’s position as an EU member
state outside the euro area. Denmark’s referendum on 2 June 1992 rejected the
Maastricht Treaty by a narrow majority of 50.7 per cent. The Edinburgh Deci-
sion on 11-12 December 1992 comprised special Danish arrangements in four
areas of the Maastricht Treaty, including EMU. In relation to EMU the arrange-
ment implied that Denmark immediately exercised its right as laid down in the
protocol to notify the Council that it would not participate in Stage 3 of EMU. A
second Danish referendum on 18 May 1993 produced a majority of 56.7 per cent
of the votes in favour of the Maastricht Treaty and the Edinburgh Decision. In
March 2000 the Danish Prime Minister called a referendum for 28 September
2000 on Denmark’s adoption of the euro. The bill was rejected by the referendum
in September 2000, with 53.1 per cent of the votes against the adoption of the
1 Ret. Danmarks Nationalbank.
2 Danmarks Nationalbank.
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Nationalbank issued a joint press release stating that Denmark would continue
its fixed-exchange-rate policy within the framework of ERM II.
Having the exchange rate as the intermediate target provides a simple and unam-
biguous rule for monetary policy in Denmark (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2009).
Danmarks Nationalbank’s interest rates normally mirror those fixed by the ECB
for the euro area. Minor fluctuations in the exchange rate is addressed by pur-
chasing and selling foreign exchange against kroner (intervention), cf. Chart 4. If
there is a prolonged tendency for the krone to strengthen or weaken, Danmarks
Nationalbank unilaterally adjusts its interest rates. Weakening of the krone can
be countered by raising Danmarks Nationalbank’s interest rates relative to those
of the ECB, since it is more attractive to invest in kroner when the rate of interest
is higher, cf. Chart 5. Conversely, Danmarks Nationalbank may counter a ten-
dency for the krone to strengthen by reducing its interest rates.
In a fixed-exchange-rate regime the monetary-policy interest rates are reserved
for managing the exchange rate. In a world with free capital flows this leaves no
scope for using the monetary policy interest rate as an instrument for stabilising
the domestic business cycle (McKinnon, 1993; Obstfeld, Shambaugh & Taylor,
2005). Since monetary policy cannot be used for cyclical purposes, it is important
that both fiscal policy and other economic policies are oriented towards economic
stability so that both overheating and high unemployment is addressed.
Times of international financial turmoil often constitute an acid test of fixed
exchange-rate regimes. This lesson was leaned the hard way during the crisis in
the European Monetary System in the early 1990s where several countries had to
abandon a fixed exchange rate regime and opt for inflation targeting.
The Danish fixed exchange rate policy survived the crisis in the early 1990 and
has served the Danish economy well during the last couple of decades (Abildgren
et al., 2010). The paper at hand reviews the Danish monetary and foreign-
exchange policy during the financial crisis in 2008 where the Danish fixed
exchange-rate peg came under pressure.
There seems to be ten general lessons to learn from the crisis regarding the art of
conducting a successful monetary policy in a fixed-exchange-rate regime. None
of these lessons are new. However, since currency crises and banking crises are
low probability events (“tail events”) a review of the lessons might be of interest.
Before the review two more general issues should be mentioned. First, even
though Denmark has chosen a different monetary-policy strategy from that of
other smaller European countries, the outcome is not necessary significantly dif-
ferent. This can be illustrated by the economic development in the Nordic coun-
tries since the middle of the 1990s. During this period, the Nordic countries have
pursued different monetary-policy strategies:
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– Denmark has conducted a fixed-exchange-rate policy against the D-mark
and, from 1999, the euro;
– Finland switched to an inflation target in 1993. In 1996 it joined the ERM,
and in 1999 it adopted the single European currency, the euro;
– Sweden has chosen to operate within the framework of an inflation target
regime since 1995;
– Norway operated with a trade-weighted exchange-rate index until 2001,
when it also switched to an inflation target.
Despite the different strategies the outcome measured in terms of inflation and
output volatility is comparable, cf. Christensen & Hansen (2003) and Chart 6. It
is important to note that there does not seem to be any indications that Den-
mark’s fixed-exchange-rate policy has led to more volatility in the economy com-
pared with the other Nordic countries with other monetary-policy strategies. The
development in the long-term interest rates in the four countries is also quite
similar, cf. Chart 7.
Second, when comparisons are made between the recent financial crisis and the
currency crisis in the ERM in the early 1990s one has to keep in mind that the
period since 1990 has been characterised by declining significance of gross pay-
ments linked to the current account of the balance of payments compared with
gross payments linked to the financial account, cf. Chart 8. In the late 1980s,
“current” gross payments accounted for around 50 per cent of total gross pay-
ment flows across Denmark’s borders. By the mid 2000s, this share had declined
to 14 per cent. Consequently, today capital flows are all-important to the short-
term development in the exchange rate of the krone.
3.2. REDUCED EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY- AND 
FOREIGN-EXCHANGE-POLICY INSTRUMENTS DURING 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The international financial crisis escalated during the autumn of 2008. The Dan-
ish krone weakened in September and October 2008 after a period with a nega-
tive spread between Danmarks Nationalbank’s lending rate and the ECB’s allot-
ment rate, cf. Chart 9 (left). The negative interest-rate spread reflected a strong
demand from credit institutions in the euro area for liquidity in the ECB’s weekly
tenders, which led to an increase in the ECB’s allotment rate. Towards the end of
September the ECB’s allotment rate was almost 50 basispoints higher than the
ECB’s minimum bid rate. Another factor contributing to the pressure on the
krone was the tendency for investors to withdraw from minor currencies, includ-
ing the Danish krone, as a result of the intensified financial crisis. There were also
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rumours in the market that certain foreign investors were speculating against the
krone, e.g. via FX options.
To stabilise the krone, Danmarks Nationalbank intervened in the foreign-
exchange market for considerable amounts in the late September and early Octo-
ber 2008. However, this proved insufficient to withstand the pressure on the
krone, and in accordance with the rules of the game in a fixed-exchange-rate
policy Danmarks Nationalbank unilaterally raised its monetary-policy interest
rates, whereby the spread to the euro area widened. With effect from 8 October
2008, the lending rate was raised by 0.4 percentage point, thereby increasing the
spread to ECB’s minimum bid rate to 0.75 percentage point.
However, Danmarks Nationalbank continued to intervene in the foreign-
exchange market after the interest-rate increase. At midday on 8 October, the
ECB announced its decision to lower interest rates by 0.5 percentage point, citing
the intensifying financial crisis as the background. Since Danmarks Nationalbank
maintained its monetary-policy interest rates, the spread between the monetary-
policy interest rates in Denmark and the euro area widened further.
Despite this widening, the krone was still under pressure due to the outflow of
foreign exchange. This prompted Danmarks Nationalbank to intervene again at
the middle of October. The net intervention sale of foreign exchange with settle-
ment in October 2008 totalled DKK 64 billion, cf. Chart 9 (right) and Table 1.
As a memorandum item it can be mentioned that the net intervention sale of
foreign exchange with trading day in July 1993 totalled DKK 50 billion.
On 24 October, Danmarks Nationalbank raised the lending rate by a further 0.5
percentage point, thus widening the spread to the ECB’s fixed allotment rate to
1.75 percentage points. This proved sufficient to stabilise the krone again. The
krone strengthened from the end of October, and Danmarks Nationalbank was
able to buy back foreign exchange over the subsequent months. This enabled
Danmarks Nationalbank gradually to reduce its monetary-policy interest rates
again, thus narrowing the spread to the ECB.
Lesson 1: FX interventions can only be used to smooth out minor fluctu-
ations in the exchange rate when the foreign exchange markets are calm.
When faced with a strong pressure on the currency in a fixed-exchange-
rate regime a swift and sizeable increase in the interest-rate spread vis-à-
vis the currency anchor is required.
The large amounts of interventions in support of the Danish krone and the sizable
increase in the interest-rate spread via-à-vis the euro area that was necessary to
stabilise the krone clearly illustrates that the interest sensitivity of portfolio capi-
tal flows was very low during the crisis in the autumn of 2008. In times without
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turmoil on the foreign-exchange markets the interest-rate sensitivity is usually
substantial higher. A recent example occurred in February 2006, where the
Nationalbank raised its lending rate by just 0.1 percentage point. This unilateral
interest-rate increase was modest but nevertheless sufficient to stabilise the krone
even though the Nationalbank prior to the interest-rate hike had sold foreign
exchange for substantial amounts (DKK 34 billion) in order to stabilise the krone.
Lesson 2: The interest sensitivity of portfolio capital flows is regime
dependent. During financial turmoil interest-rate sensitivity of capital
flows can decline substantially.
At the peak of the crisis in October 2008 the size of the Nationalbank’s foreign-
exchange reserve also came into focus. Rumours were circulating in the market
that the Nationalbank had insufficient reserves to maintain the fixed-exchange-
rate peg. In the month after October 2008 the Nationalbank chose to increase the
size of the foreign exchange reserve in order to send a strong signal to the market
regarding the commitment to the fixed exchange rate peg, cf. Chart 10. In this
connection it should also be noted that the Nationalbank since the second half of
the 1990s has chosen to stabilise the krone-rate at a level close to its central rate
within the ERM. The ERM rules on automatic and unlimited intervention credit
apply only at the intervention limits.
Lesson 3: The size of the foreign-exchange reserves plays an important
role in signalling commitment to the fixed-exchange-rate regimes during
periods with turmoil on the FX markets.
History has shown that banking crisis and currency crisis often occur together as
“twin crisis” (Allen & Gale, 2007; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). This was also the
case for Denmark in October 2008, and naturally it presented a challenge to
communicate the need to raise interest rates in Denmark at a time when other
central banks around the world were lowering theirs to support the financial sec-
tor in order to address the international financial crisis.
Lesson 4: The proper interest-rate response in a fixed-exchange-rate
regime during times of crisis is rarely a convenient and popular move.
3.3. DYSFUNCTIONAL INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS
The substantial intervention sales in October 2008 drained the foreign-exchange
reserve. In previous crises, it had been possible immediately to increase the
reserves by issuing short-term Kingdom of Denmark commercial papers and later
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replacing these by longer-term loans if necessary, cf. Chart 11 for a case study of
1993.
However, the experience from the autumn of 2008 showed that it was not always
possible to raise large amount of foreign exchange within a short timeframe via
the CP market. Furthermore, it took quite a while before the government was able
to raise longer-term foreign loans at acceptable prices. Borrowings at a too high
interest rate entailed a risk of signaling an urgent need for foreign exchange and
thereby intensify the pressure on the krone.
Lesson 5: When they are needed the most foreign exchange reserves can
be difficult to obtain.
The foreign-exchange reserve is, in principle, an expense to Danmarks National-
bank. The reason is that the foreign-exchange reserve is offset by interest-bearing
deposits in Danish kroner – either from banks or from the central government –
while most of the foreign-exchange reserve is remunerated at the short-term euro
rate, which is lower than the short-term rate of interest in Denmark. During time
of pressure on the krone the short-term interest-rate differential widens. This
increases the cost of holding FX reserves and the sizable increase of the foreign-
exchange reserve has reduced the net profit of the Nationalbank substantially. In
May 2009, it was therefore decided temporary (until end-2010) to reduce the
interest payable on the central government’s deposit at the Nationalbank.
Lesson 6: The costs of holding foreign exchange reserves are low when
the reserves are not needed (times without currency turmoil) and expen-
sive when the are needed (during periods of currency turmoil).
The dysfunctional international financial markets made it also difficult for pri-
vate banks in Denmark and other countries to obtain the necessary dollar and
euro liquidity. In September and October 2008 Danmarks Nationalbank inter-
vened in the FX swap market in order to ease the access to liquidity in foreign
currency in the Danish banking sector. On 18 September dollars were offered
against kroner for a total of DKK 3 billion with a maturity of 7 days. Likewise,
in early October, Danmarks Nationalbank intervened in the euro market, offering
euro for a total of DKK 17 billion with maturities of 7 days and 1 month (Bern-
stein, 2010).
The intervention in the FX swap market turned out to have only a temporary
impact on the market. The Danish market for euro and dollar liquidity is consid-
erable, and intervention in the FX swap market also reduces the foreign-exchange
reserve.
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Danmarks Nationalbank was able to establish a swap line (fully collateralised)
with the US Federal Reserve on 24 September 2008. The needs for this facility
was highlighted by the fact that volumes offered at dollar auctions were drawn
upon in full. On 27 October 2008, Danmarks Nationalbank and the ECB estab-
lished an equivalent swap line for EUR 12 billion. Although this limit was not
reached, it eased the access to euro liquidity for Danish banks significantly. The
swap facilities were thus very helpful in addressing the banks’ needs for liquidity
in dollars and euro. Furthermore, the swap-line with the ECB in October sent a
strong signal to the market regarding the commitment to the fixed exchange rate
peg vis-à-vis the euro.
Lesson 7: The swap arrangements between the central banks during the
crisis were a success.
3.4. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE MONEY MARKET, 
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY-POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS AND GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES
The financial crisis generated tensions in the money market in several countries,
including Denmark. Loss of confidence between the banks led to restraint on
uncollateralised lending in the money markets. The market players sought to safe-
guard their own liquidity and hesitated to grant loans to counterparties, particu-
larly at long maturities. The spread between collateralised and uncollateralised 3-
month money market interest rates multiplied, cf. Chart 12.
In connection with the financial turmoil Danmarks Nationalbank expanded its
collateral base to facilitate pledging of collateral by monetary-policy counterpar-
ties, thereby providing increased access to monetary-policy loans. Furthermore,
temporary emergency lending facilities were established. Most of these measures
were implemented during the spring and summer of 2008 and eased the bank’s
access to krone liquidity, especially prior to the establishment of government
guarantees for the banking sector, cf. below. At the end of February 2011 most of
these temporary measures ceased.
The experience seems to have been similar in other countries. The Financial Sta-
bility Forum, which comprises, among others, the ministries of finance, central
banks and financial supervisory authorities of the major economies, has con-
ducted an analysis of the factors and the underlying weaknesses in the financial
system that led to the outbreak of financial turmoil in the summer of 2007. In its
report, it encouraged central banks to ensure that their operational frameworks
are sufficiently flexible to address extraordinary situations (Financial Stability
Forum, 2008a and 2008b).
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Lesson 8: The operational framework for monetary policy implementa-
tion must be sufficiently flexible to address extraordinary liquidity situa-
tions in the money market.
However, the financial crisis escalated in September 2008 when the US govern-
ment took control of the mortgage giants, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and the
investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy (Chapter 11). This sent
shockwaves through the financial markets as they had expected a bailout along
the same lines as the Bear Stearns case in the spring of 2008.
It became clear that the international financial crisis was a real threat to financial
stability worldwide. At the same time, it had moved beyond a liquidity crisis that
central banks could alleviate by providing liquidity to the markets. The crisis had
deeper roots, the banks’ capital adequacy was called into question, and quite
extraordinary measures were needed in order to restore stability and confidence
in the financial markets.
In Europe, Ireland was the first country to provide a government guarantee for
the banking sector. The Irish government guarantee created a snowball effect
throughout Europe, and the other EU member states, including Denmark, had to
issue guarantees for their banking sectors – wholly or partially, cf. Danmarks
Nationalbank (2008).
On 5 October 2008, the Danish Contingency Association3 concluded an agree-
ment on financial stability (Bank Rescue Package) with the Danish government.
Under the agreement, the government provided an unlimited guarantee to all
depositors and other unsecured creditors in banks in the Kingdom of Denmark.
The guarantee was not a free lunch for the banks, however. The payments from
the Danish Contingency Association under Bank Rescue Package constituted up
to DKK 35 billion. Participation in the government guarantee under Bank Rescue
Package was voluntary, but all Danish banking institutions except a few very
small institutions joined the scheme.
The need for this initiatives should be viewed against the background of the large
deposit deficit (customer funding gap) that had been build up in the Danish bank-
ing sector prior to the crisis, cf. Chart 13, mainly reflecting Danish bank’s expan-
sion abroad. This funding gap had to a large extent been financed via foreign
lending, including short-term loans from foreign credit institutions.
However, the government guarantees was also very considerably in terms of dura-
tion (two years) as well as institutions and claims covered (DKK 4,200 billion or
around 2.5 times Denmark’s GDP). These guarantees could potentially make
large claims on the foreign-exchange reserve increased in case of the failure of a
3 A private contingency facility for winding-up of ailing banks.
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bank with large foreign liabilities. The measures to safeguard financial stability
therefore also made a substantial increase in the foreign exchange reserve neces-
sary.
Lesson 9: Short-term financing through the money and capital markets is
generally more sensitive to changes in the banking institutions’ own
credit standing than deposits are. The banks’ dependence on money mar-
ket financing thus make them vulnerable, particularly to changes in for-
eign banks’ ability and willingness to finance them during times of crisis.
If the banking system relies heavily on short-term foreign funding it can
have systemic implications and make it necessary for the central bank to
operate with a large foreign-exchange reserve, particularly in a fixed-
exchange-rate regime.
3.5. THE CHALLENGES AND COST OF BEING OUTSIDE THE 
EURO IN TIMES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
In calm periods, interest rates in Denmark will be only marginally higher than in
the euro area due to the fixed-exchange-rate regime. In turbulent periods such as
during the recent financial crisis, the spread tends to widen. Often this widening
occur at a rather inopportune time where other negative factors are affecting the
real economy. This visualises part the costs of being outside the euro area.
The financial crisis has also highlighted a number of other costs that Denmark
has to bear due to the status as a non-euro area EU member state (Bernstein,
2009). At an early stage of the financial crisis the ECB was able to conclude an
agreement with the Federal Reserve in order to provide dollar liquidity to euro
area banks. It took some time before the Nationalbank was able to present a
similar agreement for the Danish banks.
During the crisis the members of the euro area also agreed on standard-setting
recommendations for the structure and pricing of government guarantees and
capital injections in the banking sector. Denmark was not part of these negotia-
tions and the Danish guarantee scheme did therefore not follow the same stand-
ard as in most other EU countries. This made it more difficult to communicate
the content and design of the Danish guarantees to international market partici-
pants. It could also be mentioned that Denmark does not participate in the Euro-
The euro area is the second-largest currency in global terms and the ECB is there-
fore represented in all the important international forums. The regulatory follow-
up on the financial crisis is currently being debated in these forums such as the
Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Forum, G20, etc. The outcome of these
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discussions will have a major impact on the structure of the financial markets and
regulation and supervision of financial institution in the years to come. Due to its
status as a non-euro area EU member state Denmark’s influence on these interna-
tional negotiations is more limited than is the case for the euro area member
states.
Lesson 10: There is a cost to Denmark of being outside the euro. The cost
is most visible during times of crisis.
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Charts
EXCHANGE RATE OF THE KRONE VIS-À-VIS THE D-MARK   Chart 1 
Note: 
Source: 
Reverse logarithmic scale. 
Danmarks Nationalbank. 




Reverse scale. Prior to 1999 a synthetic exchange rate of the krone vis-à-vis the euro has been calculated on the basis of the 
krone/D-mark rate and the conversion rate between the euro and the D-mark fixed as at 1 January 1999. The earliest observation is 
from 12 January 1987.  
Danmarks Nationalbank. 
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Inflation in the euro area is represented by inflation in West Germany 1975-89 and in Germany 1990-98.  
Statistics Denmark, ECB and OECD. 




Monthly data. Interventions have been accrued according to the value date. Exchange rate at month-end. All interventions were 
performed by Danmarks Nationalbank.  
Danmarks Nationalbank. 
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MONETARY-POLICY INTEREST-RATE SPREAD BETWEEN DENMARK AND 




For Denmark, Danmarks Nationalbank's lending rate has been used for the entire period. For Germany, the Bundesbank's repo rate
has been used. For the euro area, for the period from 1999 to 27 June 2000 the ECB's fixed allotment rate in the main refinancing 
operations has been used. After this time, the ECB's minimum bid rate has been used until 14 October 2008, followed by the ECB's 
fixed allotment rate. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, ECB and Danmarks Nationalbank. 
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INFLATION (HICP) AND OUTPUT GAPS   Chart 6 
Note: 
Source: 
The output gap is a measure of actual GDP less potential GDP as a percentage of potential GDP. Output gaps for 2010 are forecasts. 
Reuters EcoWin and OECD. 
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YIELDS ON 10-YEAR GOVERNMENT BONDS  Chart 7 
 
Source: Danmarks  Nationalbank. 




Due to restructuring of the statistics, it is not possible to include years after 2004. Capital payments include derivatives from 2001 
onwards. Registered capital payments underestimate the actual volume of capital payments as the statement does not include 
transactions between residents and non-residents that do not affect the external position of the banking sector (after 1999: of a 
bank), e.g. purchase of foreign securities by a Danish bank. 
Danmarks Nationalbank. 
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INTEREST-RATE SPREAD AND INTERVENTIONS   Chart 9 
   
Note: 
Source: 
Left: The ECB's interest rate is the variable allotment rate (the marginal rate on the ECB's main refinancing operations) until 14 
October 2008, after which time the fixed allotment rate has been used. Right: Danmarks Nationalbank's net purchases of foreign 
exchange for intervention purposes, calculated on settlement days.  
Danmarks Nationalbank and ECB. 
INTERVENTION IN THE FOREIGN-EXCHANGE MARKET FOR DANISH 
KRONER   Table 1 
 
Purchase of foreign 
exchange 
Sale of foreign 
exchange 
Net purchase of 
foreign exchange  Number of 
intervention days  Kr. billion 
1990  .............................   30  1  29  84 
1991  .............................   1  3  -2  19 
1992  .............................   23  39  -16  33 
1993  .............................   54  84  -31  73 
1994  .............................   11  0  11  21 
1995  .............................   37  5  32  84 
1996  .............................   46  22  23  96 
1997  .............................   40  6  34  63 
1998  .............................   42  71  -30  86 
1999  .............................   62  5  56  65 
2000  .............................   21  58  -37  55 
2001  .............................   27  4  24  11 
2002  .............................   41  0  41  35 
2003  .............................   25  1  24  20 
2004  .............................   15  28  -12  34 
2005  .............................   16  34  -18  35 
2006  .............................   0  34  -34  13 
2007  .............................   17  19  -2  17 
2008  .............................   66  86  -20  48 
2009  .............................   154  0  154  46 
2010  .............................   64  18  46  22 
Note:  Interventions have been accrued according to the value date, except for interventions in the forward foreign-exchange market in 
1990-91, which have been included at the trade date. Some of the large interventions in support of the krone during the currency 
unrest in 1992-93 were made by other ERM central banks, not by Danmarks Nationalbank. Such intervention is also included in 
the table. From August 1993 all interventions were performed by Danmarks Nationalbank. 
Source:   Danmarks  Nationalbank. 
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Net assets, end of month.  
Danmarks Nationalbank. 
DANMARKS NATIONALBANK'S INTERVENTION DEBT AND THE DANISH 




The government's foreign-exchange debt in commercial papers and Danmarks Nationalbank's intervention debt are stated on a daily 
basis, while the government's medium-term and long-term foreign-exchange debt is stated on a monthly basis.  
Danmarks Nationalbank. 
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SPREAD BETWEEN UNCOLLATERALISED AND COLLATERALISED 3-




5-day moving average of daily observations. The collateralised money-market interest rate concerns repos, while the 
uncollateralised rate is CIBOR.  
Danmarks Nationalbank. 
THE BANKS' DEPOSIT SURPLUS, NET DEBT TO OTHER CREDIT 
INSTITUTIONS AND BOND ISSUES   Chart 13 
Source:  Danish Financial Supervisory Authority. 
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4. MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE ROOTS OF 
THE GLOBAL CRISIS
Pietro Catte, Pietro Cova, Patrizio Pagano and Ignazio Visco1
4.1. INTRODUCTION
While the trigger and the proximate causes of the crisis that has rocked the global
economy since the summer of 2007 were essentially financial, it has become
increasingly clear that macroeconomic imbalances were a central part of the com-
plex set of circumstances that lay at its root. In particular, the financial excesses
that led to the piling up and underestimation of risks could not have become so
widespread if the macroeconomic environment had not been characterized by
large saving-investment imbalances, very low interest rates and substantial asset
price misalignments. In the general climate of hype that those macroeconomic
conditions permitted, supervisory and regulatory failures allowed financial inno-
vations to generate serious dysfunctions in the US and global financial systems.
Moreover, the lopsided composition of global final demand in the years preceding
the crisis, with most of the world ultimately relying on US consumer spending,
essentially financed by growing mortgage debt, made the world economy
extremely vulnerable to a shock – the downturn in the US housing market – that
called this central factor of the global expansion into question. If this key source
of fragility is not borne in mind, it is difficult to explain fully the sharp and highly
synchronized contraction of world trade and the collapse of global confidence
that characterized the propagation of the global recession.
We argue that the lack of timely and sufficiently decisive policy reactions to the
domestic and external imbalances was crucial: if those imbalances had been cor-
rected, the financial turmoil would have had lesser far-reaching consequences.
Over the 10-15 years that preceded the crisis it was indeed already possible to
identify a number of signals of macroeconomic stress, which over time interacted
with flaws in the financial system to create very significant, though at the time
partly hidden, financial fragilities2.
These signals were: the dramatic fall in the US household saving rate, from
around 7 per cent in the early 1990s to close to zero in 2005-07; a sharp increase
in US and global liquidity, which largely reflected the generally accommodating
1 All the authors are at Banca d’Italia, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Rome, Italy. E-mails: pietro.catte@bancadi-
talia.it; pietro.cova@bancaditalia.it; patrizio.pagano@bancaditalia.it; ignazio.visco@bancaditalia.it. The views
expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors.
2 See VISCO, 2009, 2010.
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monetary conditions in the United States; the continuous widening of global
imbalances, already recognized as hard to sustain in the late 1990s; an enormous
increase in official reserves, mainly in emerging Asia and the oil-exporting coun-
tries, which mostly pegged their currencies to the US dollar; very low levels of
long-term interest rates and asset price volatility after 2003; and a sequence of
asset price bubbles in the United States and globally, starting with the dot-com
bubble of the late 1990s, followed by an unusually synchronized global housing
price boom.
Essentially, these disequilibria reflected rapid and sustained growth in final
demand, especially consumption demand, in the United States, financed by over-
borrowing, primarily from abroad. This occurred in a global context of excess
saving that compressed real interest rates to abnormally low levels compared with
average GDP growth. If the United States served as a sort of “consumer of last
resort”, other large advanced and emerging economies implicitly or explicitly fol-
lowed an export-led growth strategy, which is difficult to maintain indefinitely
but also difficult to abandon.
Various arguments have been put forward to explain the emergence of such dise-
quilibria. Some focus on the role of US monetary policy (see e.g. Taylor, 2007,
and the response of Bernanke, 2010), others emphasize the role of excess saving
outside the United States and the channelling of foreign saving into Treasuries,
which put downward pressure on interest rates (e.g. Bernanke, 2005, IMF, 2005).
More recently, it has been suggested that only a much broader set of interrelated
factors – macroeconomic as well as financial – could have generated a crisis of
such magnitude (Visco, 2009). Along similar lines, Bean (2009) concludes that it
would be a mistake to look for a single culprit. Optimistic views of the extent to
which the Great Moderation had reduced underlying risk, loose monetary policy
in the United States and a perverse pattern of international capital flows together
provided fertile territory for the emergence of a credit/asset-price bubble. Simi-
larly, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) argue that the global imbalances of the 2000s
and the global crisis are intimately connected, both having their origins in the
economic policies followed in a number of countries in the 2000s and in distor-
tions that influenced the transmission of these policies through the United States
and ultimately global financial markets.
In this more eclectic interpretation, which is also the one taken up here, interac-
tions among the Fed’s monetary stance, global real interest rates, credit market
distortions, and financial innovation created the toxic mix of conditions that
made the United States the epicentre of the global financial crisis. Outside the
United States, exchange rate and other economic policies followed by emerging
markets such as China helped allow the United States to borrow cheaply abroad
and thereby finance its unsustainable housing bubble.
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In this paper, a more extended version of which is Catte et al. (2011), we focus
on the period 2002-07, before the start of the financial turmoil that evolved into
the global crisis, and perform counterfactual simulations to investigate two cen-
tral elements of the story, namely: (a) an overly expansionary monetary policy
and lax supervisory policy in the United States, which may have permitted a pro-
longed expansion of debt-financed consumer spending; (b) the choice by China
and other emerging countries to pursue an export-led growth strategy supported
by pegging their currencies to the US dollar, in conjunction with sluggish domestic
demand in other advanced economies characterized by low potential output
growth. Model simulations are conducted to provide a quantitative assessment of
the effects of the different policy choices mentioned above.
Overall, our results highlight the complementarity of policy actions in the United
States and in surplus countries for the correction of both internal US and global
imbalances. In this sense, they support the fundamental assumption underlying
the current efforts to rebalance global demand in the context of the G-20 Frame-
work for strong, sustainable and balanced growth (G-20, 2009). The results lend
support to the view that if substantial and globally coordinated demand rebalanc-
ing had been undertaken early on, the imbalances would not have accumulated
to the extent that they did. Although it is hard to say whether in that scenario the
financial crisis might have been avoided, its propagation would probably have
been less destructive because both the US financial system and the global econ-
omy would have been less vulnerable to it.
4.2. OVERVIEW OF THE SIMULATION RESULTS
To carry out the simulations, we use the National Institute of Economic and Social
Research’s large-scale global macroeconomic model (NiGEM). NiGEM is an esti-
mated model, whose framework is “neo-Keynesian” in the sense that agents’
choices may be assumed to be forward-looking, but with nominal rigidities that
slow the process of adjustment to shocks. Financial asset prices are normally
assumed to be forward-looking, and affect consumer demand via wealth effects.
Monetary policy can be set according to alternative interest rate feedback rules3.
We concentrate on the period 2002-07 to investigate whether a different set of
policy actions in various areas of the world would have avoided the build-up of
domestic imbalances in the US and current account imbalances in the US and
other major areas4.
3 The main model properties of NiGEM are discussed in Barrell et al. (2004). The structure of the main equations
of the model can be found on the Niesr website (www.niesr.ac.uk).
4 By contrast, BARRELL et al., 2008, who also use the NiGEM to simulate a scenario of global imbalances correc-
tion via demand rebalancing, take 2007 as the starting point. Their scenario is centred on a large US dollar
depreciation driven by a rise in risk premia on US assets, with no exogenous change in US monetary policy.
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The counterfactual scenario that we propose combines a monetary tightening and
a credit tightening via macro-prudential policy tools in the United States with a
large increase in potential output in Japan and the larger euro area countries and
a rebalancing towards domestic demand, accompanied by an exogenous currency
appreciation, in China and other Asian surplus economies that peg to the dollar.
Furthermore, given the tighter monetary policy stance in the United States and the
reduced demand for US Treasuries coming from foreign official authorities, we
assume also an increase in the term premium on long-term bonds
4.2.1. Policy Assumptions
In the US the monetary policy tightening is assumed to begin in 2003Q1, with the
federal funds target starting from a lower initial level (1.5 per cent) and reaching
3.75 per cent in 2005Q2; the policy rate is then allowed to remain constant for
two more quarters, when it crosses the baseline, and to be determined afterwards
by a Taylor rule. Until 2005Q4, this path for the federal funds rate is very similar
to the path that would have been obtained had the Fed followed a Taylor rule
using real-time data on changes in the GDP deflator as the inflation measure (as
in the original Taylor rule specification), as suggested by Papell (2010).
Furthermore, the credit spread incorporated in mortgage rates is raised progres-
sively by 1.5 percentage points in 2003Q1-2004Q2, and by an additional 0.5
percentage point until 2006Q1; it is then assumed to return to the baseline by
early-2007.
This policy shock is calibrated so as to keep the cost of mortgages in 2002-07
close to the average recorded in the 1990s, while in reality it declined markedly.
As in the analysis conducted by the IMF (2009), the model is insufficiently rich
to specify the nature of banking supervisory or macro-prudential tools explicitly
(banks are not explicitly modelled, for example). So we assume that the policy-
maker had access to an instrument that affects mortgage credit spreads directly.
This is a simple shortcut intended to mimic the effects of, say, regulations that
require banks to set limits on housing loan-to-value ratios. Alternatively, we may
want banks to set aside more capital as asset prices rise, thus raising the margin
that banks have to charge over funding costs, yet this would also affect the cost
of business capital.
For the rest of the world, we assume that major advanced economies suffering
from particularly sluggish growth enact supply-side reforms that enhance their
potential output; this would also endogenously boost their domestic demand.
Specifically, in Japan and the three major euro-area countries (Germany, France
and Italy) we would ideally want to assume a productivity enhancement in non-
tradables (e.g. Koske and Wörgötter, 2010). This, in turn, would boost domestic
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demand via wealth effects. However, since NiGEM is a one-good model, we take
a short-cut and increase potential output directly. The size of the shock is cali-
brated so as to raise potential output growth to 2.5 per cent in 2002-07, which is
roughly equal to potential output growth in the United States in the same period.
Thereafter, counterfactual potential growth is assumed to stabilize gradually at
an average between the United States’ and the country’s baseline potential
growth. Ultimately, over the entire period, potential output growth exceeds the
baseline by 0.7 percentage points in Japan, 0.5 points in Germany and 0.3 points
in France and Italy.
In emerging countries, instead, we assume a broad range of economic reforms –
macro-fiscal management, governance – that directly rebalance the overall com-
position of demand towards the domestic component. In particular, in China and
other surplus emerging Asian economies, domestic demand is assumed to shift
upwards between 2002Q1 and 2007Q4 by an amount equal to net exports; after
that, it is allowed to revert very gradually to the baseline. These assumptions are
meant to capture a genuine rebalancing towards domestic demand, carried out
through enhanced welfare state reforms aimed at reducing precautionary saving
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006, Baldacci et al., 2010) as well as corporate gov-
ernance reforms able to reduce firms’ retained earnings.
At the same time, in China and other surplus emerging Asian economies the path
of the exchange rate is calibrated so as to ensure that the counterfactual path of
output and inflation remains as close as possible to the baseline5.
In other words, a real appreciation is engineered to ensure that the excess domes-
tic demand is directed towards imports and domestic macroeconomic balance is
maintained. In Japan and the euro area, which like all advanced economies have
a fully modeled monetary policy reaction function in NiGEM, the reaction of the
exchange rate occurs endogenously, though with some lags, via the induced
changes in monetary policy rates.
One crucial issue is how to deal with the “conundrum” of the apparent lack of
sensitivity of US long-term interest rates to the gradual rise in short rates after June
2004, which surprised many observers for being in sharp contrast with interest
rate behaviour during past policy tightening cycles (Greenspan, 2005). Many
interpretations (see Rudebusch, Sack and Swanson, 2007, for a survey) have
traced it to a decline in the term premium. For instance, Kim and Wright (2005)
estimated a three-factor affine model of the yield curve and found that the risk
premium on ten-year bonds fell by 0.8 percentage points between 2004 and 20056.
5 This allows, among other things, for an appreciation of the renminbi vis-à-vis the US dollar by an amount
cumulatively slightly larger than 20 per cent.
6 This estimate is remarkably similar to that obtained by Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004). It is slightly higher
than the estimate by Rudebusch and Wu (2007) and lower than that by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).
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As noted by Kohn (2005), the decline in term premia in the Treasury market may
have contributed to keeping long-term interest rates relatively low and, conse-
quently, may have supported the housing sector and consumer spending more
generally.
Overall, given the tighter policy stance in the United States and the reduced
demand for US Treasuries coming from foreign official authorities, in our coun-
terfactual we assume that from 2004 onwards the term premium on long-term
bonds increases everywhere by 0.8 percentage points.
In particular, we follow Craine and Martin (2009) and attribute half of the 0.8
percentage points change in the term premium to foreign holdings of Treasury
debt. This may be viewed as a conservative assumption with respect to the find-
ings of Warnock and Warnock (2006), who estimate that increased foreign
demand in 2004-05 kept the ten-year Treasury yield 0.9 percentage points lower
than it would otherwise have been. But other studies find that foreign official
purchases of Treasury securities play little or no role in explaining the decline in
long-term Treasury yields (e.g. Wu, 2008). As suggested by Rudebusch (2010),
with the benefit of hindsight it now appears that the “conundrum” was part of a
broader global credit boom characterized by an underpricing of many types of
risk, especially for fixed-income securities. Indeed, monetary policy actions may
have affected the risk-taking capacity of banks, leading to shifts in the supply of
credit (Adrian and Shin, 2008, 2009). Therefore, we also assume that tighter
liquidity conditions would have reduced the appetite for risk (or the search for
yield), resulting in higher term premia.
4.2.2. Results
In the United States, the contractionary effect of tighter monetary policy is com-
pounded by the increase in real interest rates due to the global demand shock and
the higher term premium. Accordingly, output falls by about 3 per cent relative
to the baseline by 2005. The increase in the price level is transitory and disappears
after the third year of the simulation.
The effect on real house prices is substantial: by end-2006 they are 8 per cent
lower than the baseline. Their cumulative increase between end-2001 and the
peak (2006Q4) is cut by 11 percentage points relative to the baseline (from 31 to
20 per cent). This means that while real house prices actually increased by almost
4 per cent per year in the six years between 2002 and 2007, according to the
counterfactual in the same period they would have increased by 2.7 per cent per
year, which is much closer to the average annual growth in the previous decade
(2.2 per cent, Figure 1, left-hand panel).
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The improvement in the US current account deficit comes to 1.6 percentage
points of GDP by end-2007. The implied real depreciation of the dollar amounts
to less than 5 per cent by end-2007. The improvement in the current account also
continues in the remaining years of the simulation exercise, when it exceeds 2 per-
centage points of GDP.
In Japan, the higher potential output deepens deflation on impact, but just
slightly. The expansionary effect of the increase in domestic demand is only par-
tially offset by the fall in equity prices due to expectations of a long-lasting mon-
etary tightening (even though the actual policy tightening occurs only several
years later, since policy rates were initially above the desired level owing to the
zero lower bound). Thus, the deviation of output from the baseline is substantial.
The large increase in domestic absorption causes the current account surplus to
shrink relative to the baseline by around 2.5 percentage points of GDP by 2007.
In Germany too, the shock to potential output pushes inflation slightly below the
baseline. Output growth jumps above the baseline on impact and then slows
down, but remains persistently above the base. For the euro area as a whole, the
net effects are more limited (output rises permanently above the baseline, by 1 per
cent by end-2007). Germany’s external surplus shrinks by 1.3 percentage points
of GDP by 2007. The euro area’s external balance changes very little.
In China, output remains close to the baseline, as the domestic demand shock is
offset by the exchange rate appreciation; the (calibrated) renminbi appreciation
required to do that is of the order of 6 per cent on impact, relative to the baseline,
vis-à-vis the US dollar and a little more than 20 per cent by end-2007 (but just
11 per cent in real effective terms). The reduction in China’s current account sur-
plus is small initially, but increases progressively after 2004 and exceeds 5 per-
centage points of GDP by 2007.
As a consequence, in 2001-07 the dispersion of current account balances – meas-
ured as the sum of the absolute values of the current account balances of the US,
Japan, Germany and China (G4) scaled by world GDP – would have remained
almost flat, whereas it actually doubled (Figure 1, right-hand panel).
In order to separately identify the contribution of each of the different policy
choices mentioned above, we also conducted policy simulations imposing one
shock at a time (see Catte et al., 2011, for details). Overall, the results indicate
that none of those policy changes, considered in isolation, would have been suf-
ficient to address both the US domestic and global imbalances to a substantial
extent. In fact, a tighter US monetary policy would not have been enough to
dampen the housing bubble, without a simultaneous tightening of credit stand-
ards. Combining both policies would have had a significant effect on house
prices, but only a modest one on the US current account deficit. That would have
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required a simultaneous demand expansion in surplus countries resulting from
significant structural reforms and accompanied by exchange rate adjustment. On
the other hand, policy changes in surplus countries alone would have induced
only modest endogenous policy changes in the United States, and therefore would
have had a negligible impact on that country’s domestic imbalance.
Figure 1: Actual and counterfactual US real housing prices and dispersion in current 
account balances
4.3. GOING FORWARD
Was the Great Recession avoidable? It is probably impossible to tell, but this
paper shows that with a different set of economic policies in various areas of the
world the global environment could have been substantially different. In particu-
lar, had monetary and financial supervision policies been tighter in the United
States, had productivity-enhancing structural policies been implemented in Japan
and Europe, and had policies conducive to rebalancing towards domestic demand
been pursued in emerging Asian economies, in combination with enough
exchange rate flexibility to maintain domestic balance, the pattern of current
accounts would have been considerably more balanced and US housing prices
would have grown at a much slower pace. For the United States, the cost of these
policies would have been lower output and temporarily higher inflation, but the
loss in output (less than 3 percentage points below the baseline in 2006) is half as
big as the output loss at the trough of the recession (6 percentage points relative
to the pre-crisis trend in 2009Q2). Furthermore the output “loss” is truly a loss
only if the baseline output level can be regarded as sustainable. But, in fact, part
of the lower output would have simply reduced the positive output gap, estimated
by the OECD at 1.7 per cent in 2006 (OECD, 2010b). The remaining part may
be interpreted as a reduction in potential output deriving from maintaining real
interest rates at more normal levels instead of the unusually low levels experi-
enced during the period of easy credit over much of 2000s (OECD, 2010a). For
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the other major economies the rebalancing of global demand, through a shift
towards greater reliance on domestic demand in China and an increase in poten-
tial output growth in Europe and Japan, would have compensated the slowdown
induced by tighter US monetary and supervision policies, helping markedly to
mitigate the international distortions that facilitated the build-up of the crisis.
The fundamental macroeconomic imbalances that lay at the root of the financial
turmoil have not being righted by the consequent global recession. After a tem-
porary narrowing induced by the rise in US private sector saving and the sharp
fall in investment, partly offset by a larger public sector deficit, the US current
account deficit is again on the rise according to IMF projections (Figure 2).
Underlying this is the only limited rebalancing between domestic demand and
exports that has occurred in both deficit and surplus economies. Figure 3 suggests
that, in the absence of structural policy changes supporting the necessary rebal-
ancing, the pre-crisis pattern of growth drivers is now re-emerging.
This scenario is further complicated by the huge accumulation of public debt,
which could lead to higher borrowing costs if markets became concerned about
its sustainability, and the protracted period of very low policy interest rates and
abundant liquidity, which could end up fuelling new asset price bubbles, thus
creating the conditions for the next crisis.


















Source: World Economic Outlook, April 2011.
Projections
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Figure 3: Contribution to GDP growth and current account balances
The need to achieve a major rebalancing of global demand through policies aimed
at a more sustainable pattern of growth has not been eliminated by the crisis. In
order to reduce the risk that macroeconomic imbalances and distortions in the
financial system might again combine to produce large-scale, devastating finan-
cial crises in the future, it is essential to address systemic fragilities. Important
changes in financial market regulation and banking supervision are already being
introduced. In the macroeconomic field, an effort is being made to strengthen
economic policy coordination in the context of the G-20. However, it is also nec-
essary to review how macroeconomic policies are conducted in light of the expe-
rience of the crisis. Two areas where a rethinking is already under way are mon-
etary policy frameworks – and, in particular, how and to what extent they should
take into account asset market developments and associated financial fragilities –
and exchange rate arrangements.
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5. MONEY MARKET INTEGRATION AND 
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Abstract
When the first phase of the crisis focused primarily on the interbank market vol-
atility, the second phase spread on the instability of public finance. Although the
overall stance of public finances of the new members is better than the old mem-
ber countries, the differences within the new group are significant (from the per-
former Estonia to the laggard Hungary). Sovereign CDS spreads have become
major variables focused on risks and expectations about the fiscal situation of
different countries. In the paper we investigate, first, whether there is a link in the
new member states (NMS) between the expectations about the condition of their
public finances and the dynamics of money markets, including integration of
national money markets with the euro area. In others word we contribute to clar-
ify the relationship between fiscal and liquidity risks as major components of
systemic risk. Second, we look on the particularities of this relationship through
the different phases of the crisis and across the different countries using different
monetary regimes. This concerns mostly two opposite extreme monetary regimes,
namely, currency boards – Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, or inflation targeting –
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. The results obtained form the
high frequency panel data models support the theoretical hypotheses and policy
intuition that exists strong relationship between the liquidity risk (measured by
the short term money markets) and fiscal risk (measured by CDS) and that this
link is extremely unstable and in some sense nonlinear during the financial crisis.
Our study confirm that the strong link between monetary and public finance risk
as apart of total systemic risk increase during the crisis especially for currency
boards regimes, when the link becomes stronger and pronounced. For the infla-
tion targeting countries the link became weaker and less pronounced.
Keywords: money markets, sovereign CDS spreads, EU enlargement, monetary
regimes, financial crisis
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5.1. INTRODUCTION
The crisis placed again in the center of attention on the EU stability and expan-
sion of the euro area, on monetary and fiscal integration of new countries and
their resistance to various types of shocks.
In the few years before the onset of the crisis, the EU enlargement moved without
significant disruptions and according to the institutional frameworks needed for
the next step – the enlargement of the euro zone. The main theoretical discussion
was limited generally to the question of how different types of monetary and
exchange rates regimes are able to fulfil criteria for nominal and real convergence
and to protect against asymmetric shocks. As a rule, the monetary policies of the
NMS closely followed the ECB policy, either in the discretionary regime (inflation
targeting), or passively (currency boards or quasi fixed exchange rate). The con-
vergence of monetary variables, particularly interest rates was relatively well
developed, and generally satisfactory nominal integration was observed. This
concerned especially the interbank money market, which is not only a key ele-
ment in the transmission of monetary policy, but also serves as an indicator for
the liquidity stance, for interbank risk and for overall confidence in the banking
system.
Current crisis that started during the 2007 has gone through two phases, which
are reflected on the NMS, especially after September 2008 (Gardo and Martin,
2010). When the first phase of the crisis focused primarily on the interbank mar-
ket volatility, the second phase spread on the instability of public finance.
Although the overall stance of public finances of the new members is better than
the old member countries, the differences within the new group are significant
(from the performer Estonia to the laggard Hungary). In this second phase, of
sovereign CDS spreads have become a major variable for observation, focused on
risks and expectations about the fiscal situation of different countries.
Several interesting theoretical and practical issues appear. First one is, whether
there is a link in the NMS between expectations about the condition of the public
finances and the dynamics of money markets, including integration of their
money markets with the euro area. This means investigating the links between
fiscal and liquidity risks as major components of systemic risk, or, which is
another manifestation of the above – a correlation between the macro (public),
and micro (bank) dimensions of the systemic risk. Second, how the above men-
tioned link, if exists and a priori it should exist, will develop in time and in dif-
ferent phases of a crisis and how it evolves according to different countries mon-
etary regimes. This concerns mostly two opposite extreme monetary regimes,
namely, currency boards – Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, or inflation targeting –
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. We also include in our study
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Latvia as a country with fixed-exchange rate, but not a currency board. Thus, our
study is comparative in nature and allows opposing various monetary and
exchanging rate regimes4.
After exposing our theoretical motivations and objectives (part 1), and briefly
presenting the related studies and empirical strategies (part 2), we discussed the
results form the daily data panels models and we stress some limitations and
possible developments of our study.
5.2. THEORETICAL MOTIVATION: INTEGRATION OF 
MONEY MARKETS AND FISCAL RISKS
In the current global and European crisis several phases emerged, two of them are
of particular importance. The first one is money market crisis when confidence
between banks ultimately led to deep changes in the principles and techniques of
central bank monetary policies (quantitative easing, non-standard measures,
abandonment of the so called separation principle etc...). The second phase con-
cerns the crisis of public finances and public debt, which appears later and was
largely cumulative result of massive fiscal stimulus taken at the outset and
designed to help the banking sector and to compensate for the ineffectiveness of
monetary measures5.
In the first phase the attention of investors, bankers, and businesses interested in
European economy was nailed on the state of money market, although a theoret-
ical perspective, such markets have been in same respects forgotten and unex-
plored (Holthausen and Pill (2010)6. After a long period of convergence and sta-
bility these markets started to experience sharp fluctuations (mainly increases)
and pronounced divergence of national interest rates dynamics7. Short-term inter-
est rates (unsecured overnight interest rates, and 3 months rates) were of partic-
ular importance because they reflect not only changes in short-term liquidity of
the banking sector, but also confidence in the banking system as a whole. Shorts
term interest rates are closely related to the formation of a term structure of the
yield curve, indicator of current and anticipated economic development, and they
represented a major signal for future interventions by central banks. On the
charts 1 and 2 are presented the respectively the overnight interest rates dynamics
4 For details see review articles of BALL, 2010 and FRANKEL, 2010, and for Eastern Europe see GARDO and
MARTIN, 2010.
5 See details for Ecofin (2009), BNB (2010), ECB, (2010), Berglof et al. (2009), Gardo and Martin (2010),
Cerisier (2010), Bordes and Clerc (2010).
6 According to Di Fiore and Tristani (2010, p. 10): “Some of the links between financial markets and the macro-
economy remain imperfectly understood, notably the link between interbank markets and aggregate economic
dynamics”.
7 Key turning points were in August 2007 and September 2008, when they were coordinated and sharply reduced
key interest rates of leading central banks to arrive in June 2009 when the ECB injected a huge amount of
442 billion euros.
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and 3 month money market rate dynamics, compared to the ECB credit and
deposit facilities interest rates.
Chart 1. Dynamics of overnight interest rates in New Member States
Chart 2 Dynamics of 3 months interest rates in new member states
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As to the second phase of the crisis, the attention of investors, bankers and poli-
ticians was focused on different indicators for fiscal risks (default, payment
arrears on sovereign bonds, etc.), including spreads of CDS8 which highs reached
in March 2009 and mid-April 2010 (see Chart 3). When the interest spreads in
the interbank market, showing the state of confidence in the banking system and
micro-level risks, CDS is indicator for the confidence and the sustainability of
fiscal and debt policy, i.e. macro-risks. Although CDS spreads, and the risk pre-
miums on the sovereign debt of EU member states clearly include speculative
component, CDS spreads are important indicators and should be in the focus of
analyses9.
Chart 3 Dynamics of the CDS to the new member states
There is no doubt that different links exist between the state of confidence in the
interbank market and confidence in public finances as integral parts of systemic
risk and financial stability.
First, the impact of fiscal risks on the money market is going through changes in
bank balance sheets where sovereign securities are presented. Any worsening of
expectations for a moratorium or debt restructurings automatically reflected on
the state of the banking system, the CDS of individual banks is rising, and hence
influenced the dynamics of interest rates at the money market. The CDS spreads
even became an important factor in price setting mechanism of the banking
liquidity during the second phase of the crisis, thus directly influencing the behav-
iour of interbank interest rates10. During the crises overnight interest rates at the
interbank market could be seen even as a measure for credit risk of banks (not
8 The market for CDS (credit default swap) as part of the market in credit derivatives has grown particularly
rapidly in the last decade, resulting in standardized and certain technical innovations which continue today, see
for details (PACKER and SUTHIPHONGCAHI, 2003, ICE 2010).
9 See for more details PROUTAT, 2011.
10 Anecdotal evidences show that foreign banks while providing liquidity to their daughter-banks in NMS during
the crisis used CDS spreads as a part of the price of the funding.
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only liquidity) because of the loss of confidence between banks. This increased
the importance of the link between CDS spreads and interest rates.
Second, opposite influence exists, from money market interest rates to fiscal
imbalances, and is expressed primarily in the fact that the government is the guar-
anty of the stability of the banking sector, evidenced by a series of measures of
bank capitalization and restructuring. Thus, any disturbance of the money mar-
ket and more expensive resources, leads to accumulation of costs for the budget
and ultimately worsen the solvency of governments.
In the NMS, the links already mentioned are interwoven theoretical and practical
problems associated with the dynamics of convergence and comparative effective-
ness of different monetary regimes.
First, as mentioned in the introduction, before the crisis the main issue for the
comparative analysis concerned the choice of monetary and currency exchange
regimes for achieving monetary and real convergence. Monetary convergence, i.e.
similar movement of interest rates with that in the euro area members was con-
sidered and is considered the minimum requirement for a successful adoption of
the common monetary policy. In this sense, the interest rate channel and inter-
bank interest rates are leading link in the chain of transmission mechanism. Crisis
change things or at least put them in new conditions. It not only cast doubt on
the sustainability of the trend towards monetary integration in the NMS, but also
gave impetus to the destruction of the monolithic behavior of the new countries,
allowing identifying different individual trajectories, depending on the state of
public finance, banking systems, and overall structural reforms. Roughly crisis
gave a new opportunity for expression of the diversity of transition, which has
long been subject to thorough analysis and numerous publications11.
Second, the dynamics of monetary convergence especially that of the interbank
market, considered within the broader discussion on optimality of the European
currency zone, and allows the benchmarking of monetary regimes performance
in the NMS. This concern the current state of the almost bipolar choice of mon-
etary regimes, on the one side Currency boards and quasi-fixed rates in Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and on the other side inflation targeting and floating
rates in the Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania12. The bipolar situation
provides opportunities for almost a natural experiment for the success of the
two different monetary systems13. In fact this polarity was reached through a
11 See KORNAI, 2000, ASLUND, 2002, COLOMBATTO, 2002, WINIECKI, 2004, CSABA, 2007, BOHLE and GRESKO-
VITS, 2007, HAVRYLYSHIN, 2009 and others.
12 Slovakia and Slovenia are not subject to analysis; they are full members of the eurozone.
13 See e.g. the discussion about the comparative success of different countries in combating the crisis made in
ASLUND, 2009 and GARDO and MARTIN, 2010. Aslund said the main reason for the crisis is the course currency
regime and the crisis is particularly serious where the scheme is rigid (Currency boards) and relatively mild pass
to inflation targeting. Although Aslund’s theoretical considerations are interesting, the facts, however, do not
confirm his claim, even opposite. Telling evidence is the comparative situation of Estonia and Hungary, consid-
ered the first member of the eurozone by 2011, and the second – the boundaries of financial collapse.
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long evolution, in which stood out different trends and groupings (Nenovsky,
2009).
Third, disputes between supporters of the CBA and inflation targeting in post-
communist countries have a long history, which acquires real practical terms. It
is generally believed that Currency boards give greater opportunities for rapid
monetary integration, because the interest rates passively follow the euro area,
due to the effects of credibility and discipline14. Credibility and discipline effects
provide an opportunity for a tight fiscal policy and low public debt. For its part,
proponents of inflation targeting indicate that this arrangement allows for greater
autonomy and monetary response to asymmetric shocks, and that the Currency
boards are highly vulnerable. According to them, the effects of credibility and
discipline are not weaker under the regime of monetary discretion than under the
rigid monetary rule. Experience shows, however, that the state of the MNS and
certain preconditions for the integration of the euro area, the opportunities for
independent monetary policy are small and almost insignificant. This is con-
firmed by the behavior of interest rates before the start of the crisis, which had
similar convergence dynamics.
5.3. RELATED STUDIES AND EMPIRICAL MODELS
For the purposes of empirical measurement general theoretical relationship
between bank and fiscal risks is limited to an analysis of the relationship between
short-term interest rates on money market (overnight interest rates and three-
month interest rates) and spreads on sovereign CDS premiums in different phases
of the crisis, as well as two main monetary regime. We could use as well govern-
ment bond spreads as a proxy for fiscal risks, but there are limitations in the data
availability for this indicator. Countries are examined in two main groups in
terms of the monetary regime- three with currency board arrangements and four
with inflation targeting. The first group included two Baltic countries, which at
the beginning of 90 years chose a currency board arrangement (Estonia, 1992,
Lithuania, 1994) associated with geo-strategic choice for separation from the
Soviet zone and monetary integration in Europe system. They add Bulgaria,
which in 1997 introduced a currency board. The second group of countries is that
inflation targeting selected. Here are the countries of Central Europe (Czech
Republic, 1998, Poland, 2000, Hungary, 2001) and Romania (2005).
We also included in the analysis Latvia which chose fixed exchange rate in 1993.
Although it has similarities to countries with currency boards, the developments
in this country during the crisis were different mainly regarding the stability and
14 See for the functioning of currency boards GULDE, NENOVSKY and HRISTOV, 2002, NENOVSKY, HRISTOV and
MIHAYLOV, 2002. For the inflation targeting experience in Eastern Europe see ().
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performance of the fiscal sector. Some of the NMS are characterized by high vol-
atility in its monetary variables, high budget deficits, and vulnerability to shocks
that force them to seek assistance from IMF and EU. Due to similarities in their
behavior we separated them into the third group called “deficit countries”, and
put here Hungary, Latvia and Romania.
Several studies may be useful for our analysis, although most of them did not deal
with or directly tested our dependencies. The dynamics of the whole multitude of
interest rates in new member states has been studied thoroughly and in detail by
Egert and al. (2007) in connection with problems of interest rate pass through in
5 countries of Central Europe, and Cuaresma and Wojcik (2006) to measure the
monetary independence of Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic, in different
periods of exchange rate regimes (1993-2003). Using DCC-MGARCH modeling
of the second study the authors found confirmation of the hypothesis of greater
independence at a floating rate and more in fixed. At the same bed and same
parties is the study of Habib (2002), which concentrate on short-term interest
rates, and finds a lack of dependence of interest rates in Germany.
As for NMS sovereign CDS spreads lack independent studies of their dynamics.
Indeed, the attention of researchers on the behavior of the CDS spreads is recent,
and directions for future research are numerous. Several authors establish empir-
ically that these spreads reflect quite well the state of fiscal risks and in a sense
give more and better information than sovereign ratings (Shino and Takahashi,
2010). These authors suggest that the relationship between CDS spreads and pub-
lic debt was especially shown for the countries of Southern Europe (Greece, Por-
tugal, Spain, and Italy). For its part Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) examined the
response of the CDS spreads in emerging markets in terms of changes in ratings
during 2001-2008 and found that positive changes in ratings have a stronger
effect on CDS that negative changes. An interesting empirical analysis of shocks
on the return on bank assets of major US and European banks caused by the bank
CDS indices is represented in Calice and Ioannidis (2009).
As for modeling of overnight interest rates, it has a long tradition (Hamilton,
1996; Hamilton and Jorda, 2002) and is subject to numerous and interesting
attempts to account a number of institutional and organizational factors in the
EU money market (Nautz and Offermanns, 2006; Bartolini and Prati, 2006; Cas-
sola and Mmorana, 2008; Linzert and Schmidt, 2008), and the effects of the crisis
Holthausen and Pill (2010). Modeling of overnight interest rates under a Cur-
rency board, in the case of Bulgaria was made by Nenovsky and Chobanov
(2004).
The main channels of influence of the CDS sovereign spreads to the banks’ bal-
ance sheets are presented in Fontana and Scheicher (2010). The study finds that
before the crisis market information shows low volumes in CDS trading. After
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September 2008 situation changes significantly and the active trading and higher
volumes are observed. Therefore, the importance of the information obtained
from the CDS spreads increased significantly. Moreover, for the southern coun-
tries that are members of the eurozone CDS spreads are leading and influence the
bond spreads. For the northern countries is vice versa – the bond spreads are
leading and influence CDS spreads. Southern countries are perceived as more
vulnerable and in this case CDS spreads matter a lot.
The main novelty of the present study is to investigate the direct link between
monetary and liquidity risk from one side and fiscal and country risk from others
side. Our empirical strategy is to run the panel models, linking overnight interest
rate and sovereign CDS spreads of new member states (taken either as level, or
deviation from European level). The original database we use includes daily
observations for short-term interest rates and sovereign CDS rates for the period
January, 2006, to June 2010, eighth countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bul-
garia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Romania) for Eonia (Euro Over-
night Index Average) and 3-month Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered Rate), and
sovereign CDS for Germany15. We run the panel firstly for the entire period, and
later we split the period into two parts, prior to the crisis, and during the crisis.
The first group of model (equation 1 and 2 below) present the equations of the




In (1) and (2) io denotes overnight interest rates in the new members sates and
io* – denotes Eonia, i3 presents short 3 months rates, i3* presents 3-month Euri-
bor, i and i* presents the policy rates and finally s and s* denote respectively
sovereign CDS spreads to new countries and those of Germany. The subscript i is
for country effect, and t – for the time effect. The model (1) was used for countries
with inflation targeting regime where the policy rate is discretionary formulated,
as well as for “deficit countries” In the case of Currency boards countries, there
is not discretionary policy rate, and where this rate is announced it is of purely
administrative, statistical and judiciary objectives, therefore the equation (1)
becomes (2).
The second group deals with the same relation between fiscal and liquidity risk,
and the variables are taken independently (not as a spread) and the EU short term
rates appear as explanatory variables. In this case we run the following two pan-
15 The main sources of the data are: Bloomberg, web pages of central banks, European Banking Federation.
di o it iot* – () α it α1idi it it* – () α 2idi 3it i3t* – () α 3ids it st* – () ε it ++ + + =
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The results obtained are presented in the tables 1 and 2.
Table 1 Models in spreads (equations 1 and 2)
* – significant at 1%; **-significant at 5%; *** – significant at 10%
Entire period
01/2006:05/2010
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Table 2 Models in levels (equations 3 and 4)
* – significant at 1%; **-significant at 5%; *** – significant at 10%
5.4. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS
According to the results we can observe that inflation targeting and currency
board NMS demonstrate significant differences in terms of monetary integration
and the perception of fiscal risk. Overnight interest rate spread under fixed
exchange rate in normal times depends on monetary factors mainly on expecta-
tions about future behavior of interest rates and an assessment of the liquidity
situation presented by the three-month spread. In the same period for inflation
targeting countries the spread in policy rates and the spread in three-month rates
are significant and with expected positive signs. The relationship with CDS is
significant but negative, which at first glance does not confirm the theoretical
assumption of the link between the monetary and fiscal risk. In fact the pre-crisis
period is characterized by a cycle of rising interest rates by the ECB, accompanied
by plenty of liquidity for countries with inflation targeting. And when the tries to
tighten monetary policy were observed, this is not the case in respect of the fiscal
efforts. There were budget deficits regardless of the upward phase of the cycle.
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy is not always reflected by an adequate change of the CDS
Entire period
01/2006:05/2010
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spread due to high economic growth and the underestimation of the inherent
risks. Therefore, both risks – monetary and fiscal move together, but the relation-
ship with CDS has not expected sign.
“Deficit countries” are characterized by high volatility in its monetary variables,
high budget deficits, and vulnerability to shocks. Before the crisis the behavior of
spreads is similar to that of inflation targeting countries, with the same significant
factors, and again the negative relationship with CDS.
The crisis has changed the relationship between liquidity and fiscal risks. Fiscal
risks approximated by the CDS spreads become statistically significant with the
expected positive sign in the group of currency board NMS, which mean that
higher fiscal risk leads to further rise of the liquidity risks, i.e. short term interest
rates. However, for inflation targeting countries CDS spreads are insignificant, as
is could be observed also on the Chart 3, when they remain at the lower levels
than for fixed NMS. This is another illustration of the fact that the fixed exchange
rates are perceived as riskier when using macro policy for coping with the exter-
nal shocks. But such risk assessment finds no real confirmation in practice, since
the countries with currency board are not turned to international institutions dur-
ing the crisis, and moreover, Estonia was admitted to the eurozone (January,
2011) by satisfying the necessary Maastricht criteria.
Regarding inflation targeting countries CDS spreads are no more significant, but
the remaining two factors are significant with the expected signs, although the
influence of the factors is weaker.
The crisis changes the relationship with CDS spreads for “deficit countries” and
they become significant with positive sign. The other two factors remain signifi-
cant with the expected signs, although the influence of the factors is weaker.
In terms of equations for overnight interest rates the expected relationships were
confirmed. The hypotheses of greater degree of monetary integration with the
euro before the crisis for the NMS with currency boards, and the importance of
the proper monetary policy for countries with inflation targeting regime were
supported. Deficits countries have similar behavior as inflation targeting, but the
relationship with EONIA has the negative sign, which means that the develop-
ments in their money markets have their own dynamics, which go in opposite
direction than the eurozone.
The crisis again shows the difference between currency board countries and infla-
tion targeters regarding the relationship with CDS. In the case of the currency
board countries the importance of external perception of fiscal risks increases and
CDS were statistically significant with the expected sign. In the case of countries
with inflation targeting the relationship is not significant. In the inflation target-
ing countries Eonia become significant with the expected sign, while before the
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crisis it is insignificant. The importance of external perception of fiscal risks
increases and CDS were statistically significant with the expected sign. The crisis
leads to a reduction of the impact of its own monetary policy on overnight inter-
est rates for inflation targeting and deficits countries, and in the case of deficit
countries it became even statistically insignificant. Concerning deficits countries
the overnight interest rates continue to move in the opposite direction from that
of the Eonia, but the relationship with the CDS is significant with the expected
sign.
In conclusion we can say that the results obtained form the high frequency panel
data models support the theoretical hypotheses and policy intuition that strong
relationship exists between the liquidity risk (measured by the short term money
market rates) and fiscal risk (measured by CDS), especially in currency board
countries during the crisis. The relative performance of different monetary
regimes concerning the liquidity-fiscal risk connection is debatable, and although
the countries with currency boards is perceived as more vulnerable, the recent
practice shows that they are more stable, and did not resorts to foreign financial
assistance, at least for now.
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6. FINANCIAL ASYMMETRIES, NATIONAL 
DIVERGENCES AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY 
IN A MONETARY UNION
Cristina Badarau1 and Grégory Levieuge2
Abstract
The euro area constitutes without doubt a heterogeneous monetary union. This
paper particularly analyzes the banking sector as source of structural asymmetries
and discusses their harmful implications inside a monetary union. The analysis
relies on a DSGE model of a two-country monetary union with heterogeneous
bank capital channel and wonders how macroeconomic policies could help to
mitigate the perverse effects of this heterogeneity. It is found that a centralized
monetary policy, seeking to stabilize the union-wide inflation rate, dominates a
strategy that is simultaneously concerned by the stabilization of inflation diver-
gences in the union. This is true whatever the budgetary regime (cooperative or
non-cooperative), supporting the current orientation of the European Central
Bank (ECB) policy for the euro area. Besides, national budgetary policies consti-
tute relevant instruments (although insufficient) to fight the asymmetric transmis-
sion of shocks in a monetary union with financial heterogeneities. Nevertheless,
the analysis of different policy-mixes shows that a cooperative regime is costly at
national level. Its superiority only relies on the fact that it allows a better stabili-
zation of public spending divergences
Keywords: euro area, financial heterogeneity, monetary and budgetary policy
rules, DSGE model, optimization
JEL Codes?/Classification: E44, E58, E63, C61
6.1. INTRODUCTION
Heterogeneity of the European Monetary Union (EMU) represents an important
feature that macroeconomic policies have to deal with. National inflation and
output divergences are widely recognized and one main particularity consists in
their high persistence since the beginning of the euro area3. Moreover, the evolu-
tion of inflation and output standard deviation in the euro area (12), depicted in
1 LAREFI, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, avenue Léon Duguit, 33608 Pessac, France – LEO, Université
d’Orléans, Rue de Blois, BP-6739, 45160 Orléans Cedex 2, France – Contact: florina-cristina.badarau@u-
bordeaux4.fr.
2 LEO, Université d’Orléans, Rue de Blois, BP-6739, 45160 Orléans Cedex 2, France
Contact: gregory.levieuge@univ-orleans.fr.
3 It is the conclusion of Busetti & al. (2006), who analyze the persistence of the national inflation deviations from
the union-wide average and distinguish two groups of European countries having positive or negative system-
atic inflation rate differentials from the average. Similar results about the output divergences in the euro area
are provided among others by Benalal & al. (2006) or Traistaru-Siedschlag (2006).
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Figure 1, clearly shows a significant amplification of divergences between the
European countries during the recent financial crisis.
Figure 1. Inflation and output divergence inside euro area (12)
Source: Eurostat data
To explain such divergences, the presence of asymmetric shocks is certainly insuf-
ficient. The divergences persistence and their amplification since 2007 are more
probably linked to the presence of structural asymmetries among European coun-
tries, explaining their asymmetric reaction to shocks. Indeed, the euro area mem-
bers have not been identically affected by the subprime mortgage crisis, whose
origin was however a common shock affecting the financial systems. The recent
experience has also highlighted the role of banks as key actors for the transmis-
sion of shocks, while the banking markets precisely appears as the most hetero-
geneous financial sector in the euro area (see Baele et al., 2004 or ECB, 2008, for
example).
Starting from this empirical assessment, the present study focuses on the banking
markets asymmetries in a monetary union and proposes an analysis of monetary
and budgetary policy face to such an environment. With this aim, we first model
imperfect credit markets in a double costly verification framework à la Townsend
(1979) and we explicitly show that the banks’ balance sheet structure may
amplify the transmission of shocks to the real economy (see the bank capital
channel recently discussed in the literature).
Then, we introduce heterogeneous bank capital channel in a DSGE model of a
two-country monetary union. Given the structural specificities of national bank-
ing systems, some member countries can be systematically more sensitive to
shocks than others, mainly in slowdown periods, facilitating the increase of asym-
metries. It is a realistic hypothesis for the euro area. Indeed, considering simulta-
neously the main factors underlying the bank capital channel, an empirical study
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by Badarau-Semenescu & Levieuge (2010a) indicates that European countries are
ought to be more (Germany, Italy, Netherland) or less (Finland, France, Spain)
sensitive to this mechanism.
To study the impact of financial heterogeneity in a monetary union, we simulate
different monetary, budgetary and technological shocks comparatively when the
two countries are part of a monetary union or not. It thus appears that structural
financial asymmetries lead to striking cyclical divergences among members of the
Union. It is also shown that the more financially heterogeneous the Union is, the
larger the cyclical divergences. Moreover, the conduct of a single monetary policy
for the Union as a whole seriously worsens these national divergences. These
results are generalized in Badarau-Semenescu & Levieuge (2011), in a context
that extends the present analysis by introducing financial shocks in the simula-
tions.
Finally, we optimize simple monetary and budgetary policy rules, in order to
study a suitable policy-mix able to mitigate the harmful effects of heterogeneity
in a monetary union, like the euro area. We combine centralized or based on
national information monetary policy conducted by a common central bank with
cooperative vs. non-cooperative budgetary policies decided by national govern-
ments. To summarize, the application of the policy-mix analysis supports the idea
of a centralized monetary policy conduct, rather than an inflation-divergences
oriented policy. This is true whatever the budgetary regime (cooperative or non-
cooperative), supporting the current orientation of the European Central Bank
policy for the euro area. Besides, national budgetary policies constitute relevant
instruments (although insufficient) to fight the asymmetric transmission of shocks
in a monetary union with financial heterogeneities. Nevertheless, the analysis of
different policy-mixes shows that a cooperative regime is costly at national level.
Its superiority only relies on the fact that it allows a better stabilization of public
spending divergences.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. The second section introduces an
overview of the DSGE model. The third section discusses the main results using
some simulations and optimization results, while the last section formulates con-
cluding remarks.
6.2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DSGE MODEL
The aim of this section is to provide an intuitive overview of the model, technical
details being available in Badarau-Semenescu & Levieuge (2011). The model
describes a two-country closed monetary union with price rigidities and hetero-
geneous national banking structures. It is in fact an extension of the Bernanke &
al. (1999) financial accelerator model providing evidences about the accelerating
SUERF2011_3.book  Page 67  Friday, October 21, 2011  9:17 AM68 MONETARY POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS
larcier
role of the firms’ balance sheet channel for the transmission of shocks. Our con-
tribution relative to this reference financial accelerator model consists first in
introducing the bank capital channel and second in extending the analysis in a
two-country context, in a way similar to Gilchrist & al. (2002)4. The main struc-
ture for each member country is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The main structure of the model for each member country
For a given country, households, entrepreneurs, retailers, capital producers,
banks and governments optimize their decisions in the model.
Households supply labor and own the retail firms. They receive profits from
retailers and wages from entrepreneurs, using them for consumption and savings.
Domestic households simultaneously consume domestic goods and foreign goods
produced in the other country of the union. They maximize a CES utility function
depending on consumption and leisure, subject to their budgetary constraint.
They also pay lump-sum taxes to the government, used to finance public expen-
ditures.
Entrepreneurs (firms) produce wholesale final goods in perfectly competitive
markets, using labor and capital (partially financed by debt) as inputs. Retailers
buy wholesale goods from the producers, slightly differentiate them (with no
costs) and retail them in a monopolistic competition market. As in Bernanke &
al. (1999), their role in the model is to facilitate the consideration of price rigidity,
4 GILCHRIST et al., 2002, provide a previous example in modeling a two-country monetary union with financial
heterogeneity. If their work just introduces asymmetric firms’ balance sheet channels within the union and
analyzes the transmission of technological shocks using an ad-hoc Taylor rule for the monetary policy, we
extend the study toward the consideration of the bank capital channel and we show how the model can be used
to evaluate different policy-mix strategies in an asymmetric union.
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important feature in the euro area. Retail products are bought by households for
consumption, and also by capital producers, who transform retail goods in capi-
tal (necessary to the entrepreneurs in the production process).
The banking sector has a particular place in the model. The role of banks as
financial intermediaries on the credit market is twofold. First, they participate as
lenders to the national firms’ investment projects. Second, they collect funds from
households, so as to insure the firms financing. Moreover, as discussed before, the
national banking sectors are supposed to be heterogeneous among countries. In
order to model such heterogeneity, it is assumed that the debt contracts between
households and banks on one hand, and between banks and firms in the other
hand, occur in an asymmetric information context. Entrepreneurs have private
information about the risk and the return of their projects, and banks have pri-
vate information about the risk and the realized return of their activity. In these
conditions, two agency problems occur and banks and firms have to bear finan-
cial premiums in their external financing5. More particularly, it can be shown that
the external finance premium for banks negatively depends on their own financial
structure, while the external finance for firms simultaneously depends on their
own financial leverage and on the financial situation of their creditor (bank). In
other words, banks finally transfer their financing costs to enterprises. Thus, any
shock deteriorating the banks’ financial position (their net worth) causes an
increase in the external finance premium for banks which would be finally
reflected in tighter lending conditions for firms. Such mechanism explains the role
of banks for the propagation of shocks. Their balance sheet structures may act as
an amplifier for the transmission of shocks to the real economy, which is the
essence of the bank capital channel recently debated in the literature.
In a financially heterogeneous monetary union, like the euro area, the bank cap-
ital channel is an important source of asymmetry. Heterogeneities are introduced
into the banks’ financial leverage (ratio debt/inside capital) and/or in the sensitiv-
ity coefficient of the external finance premium for banks to their financial lever-
age. Except for these financial asymmetries, we assume that the two countries are
identical (equal size, similar degree of openness to the external trade, identical
preferences for consumers, same degree of price rigidities, etc.).
The model is calibrated according to the references provided in the literature for
European countries6. It is first exposed to different symmetric monetary, budget-
ary or technological shocks, in order to comparatively analyze the reaction of
individual countries when they are part of the monetary union with centralized
monetary policy or not. Then, we are looking for a suitable policy-mix for the
5 For further details on the determination of these external finance premiums by solving the optimal financial
contracts on the credit market, see BADARAU-SEMENESCU & LEVIEUGE, 2011.
6 For details on the numerical values used in the calibration, see BADARAU-SEMENESCU & LEVIEUGE, 2011.
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union, in a context close to that of the euro area. At the union level, the common
Central Bank is responsible for the conduct of the monetary policy. The main task
of the Central Bank is to maintain the price stability and its behavior is described
by an interest rate Taylor rule. Alternative monetary objectives are considered:
union-wide inflation stabilization for a centralized monetary strategy, to which
we add an inflation divergences stabilization objective for the monetary strategy
based on national information. Governments decide the national budgetary pol-
icy with the objective to control the stability of national aggregates (inflation,
output and public expenditures). They can do it in a cooperative or non-cooper-
ative budgetary regime.
This is the theoretical framework that we use for simulations and optimization,
in order to analyze the effects of financial asymmetries and the way to mitigate
them.
6.3. SIMULATIONS AND OPTIMIZATION RESULTS
6.3.1. Financial Asymmetries, Monetary Union and 
National Divergences
A first result concerns the link between financial heterogeneity and cyclical diver-
gences inside a monetary union. As expected, the reaction of the member coun-
tries to a symmetric shock is affected by the particularities of the national finan-
cial system. It is true for all monetary, budgetary or technological shocks studied
in this work7. Moreover, a higher financial heterogeneity is associated to more
asymmetric transmission of shocks inside the union, and to higher macroeco-
nomic divergences among member countries.
To illustrate this point, Figures 3 and 4 below represent the impact of a restrictive
common monetary shock in terms of cyclical divergences8. The two sources of
financial heterogeneity previously defined are considered separately. In Figure 3 the
asymmetry affects the financial leverage of the national banking system  , cal-
culated as inside capital on assets ratio. It is fixed to 0.1 for country 1, and varies
7 BADARAU-SEMENESCU & LEVIEUGE, 2011, extend the analysis to the case of financial shocks, more realistic in
the context of the subprime mortgage crisis.
8 Since the dynamics of all national variables are discussed in BADARAU-SEMENESCU & LEVIEUGE, 2010b, we do
not insist here on this point. We just specify that the model is perfectly coherent with the economic expectations.
A nominal interest rate increase temporarily affects the real activity, because investment and consumption both
reduce (asymmetrically) in the two countries of the union. As the demand decrease, inflation falls and the
national real interest rates go up. Then, the real interest rate dynamics explain the arbitrage of the households
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within the interval   for country 2  . For  ,
the union is perfectly symmetric and there are no divergences induced by the asym-
metric transmission of the common shock. An increase in the banks’ financial lev-
erage in country 2 comparatively to country 1, equivalent to higher degree of the
union heterogeneity, comes with higher external finance premiums differentials for
banks, and consequently for firms, between the two member countries. The real
activity is thus asymmetrically affected and national divergences amplify inside the
union.
Figure 3. Banking system leverage asymmetry and national divergences
Similar results are obtained if we consider that the source of heterogeneity is not
the banking systems’ financial leverage, but rather the sensitivity coefficients of
the external finance premiums for banks to their financial leverage (psib in Figure
4). The   ratios are identical and fixed to 0.15 in the two countries, while the
sensitivity coefficient psib is fixed to 0.001 for country 1, and varies within the
interval   for country 2. In this particular case, country 2 would be
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ciated to more asymmetric transmission of the monetary shock inside the union,
and to higher inflation and output national divergences.
Figure 4. Sensitivity coefficients asymmetry and national divergences
The bank capital channel heterogeneity is certainly the main cause of such
increasing divergences. However, compared to other results found in the litera-
ture about the effect of the bank capital channel on real activity9, the amplitude
of the real variables reaction to shocks is higher in this study because of the single
monetary policy.
As a demonstration, we propose a comparative simulation of the symmetric
shocks effects at national level, when the two countries form a monetary union
or not. To simplify the interpretation of results, we assume by convention that in
country 1 the bank capital channel operates more than in country 210. For
instance, let’s take a look on the comparative dynamics of the two countries to a
technological symmetric shock, depicted in Figure 5.
9 See SUNIRAND, 2003 or LEVIEUGE, 2009.
10 The inside capital on assets ratio is lower and the sensitivity coefficient of the banks’ EFP to the financial ratio




----------- < 0.2 == ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ psib 0.002 psib* > 0.001  == ()
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Figure 5. Impulse response functions to a negative technological shock with common or 
national monetary policies
First, we easily observe that the technological shock acts as a negative supply
shock. It affects real variables and conduces to higher inflation in the two coun-
tries. However, the national reactions are not identical, the effect of the asymmet-
ric bank capital channel being definitely present. As expected, the country 1 is the
most affected by the shock. Its lower banking sector financial leverage, as well as
the more sensitive banks’ external finance premium to the financial structure,
explains this fact. The banks’ external finance premium is more reactive to the
shock in this country and its increase is transferred to the firms’ external finance
premium. This in turn increases the cost of external financing and has a negative
impact on the demand of capital, on investment and on the GDP of country 1,
comparatively to country 2. This drop in the national demand also explains the
lower increase of inflation in this country.
Second, and more importantly, one can observe that the monetary regime has an
impact on the amplitude of national divergences. Such divergences are higher in
a monetary union than under a national monetary policy regime. If the two coun-
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tries decided to form a monetary union, renouncing to their monetary autonomy,
they should be aware that the response of their national variables to shocks
would be amplified. As a common monetary policy seeks to stabilize the average
inflation of the whole area, the interest rate increase is less important in the union
than what a national monetary policy would imply for country 2 (which is by
definition less sensitive to shocks). Subsequently, this economy benefits from
lower real interest rates, which mitigates its decrease in investment and output,
and immunizes it to shocks. Thus, national real variables are too much stabilized
in the monetary union regime compared to the national monetary policy regime,
for country 2 (see Table 1).
On the contrary, the interest rate increase is more important in the union than
what a national monetary policy would imply for country 1. The participation of
this country to the asymmetric monetary union implies more adverse reactions to
shocks. National output and inflation are insufficiently stabilized in the monetary
union regime compared to the national monetary policy regime (see Table 1).
So, there is actually an endogenous mechanism explaining why an asymmetric
union worsens the cyclical divergences among member countries. We also must
specify that this is a general result which is true whatever the shocks (monetary,
budgetary, financial or technological ones)11.
Table 1. Common monetary policy and real variables stabilization*
*   denotes the standard deviation of the variable x in country i, in the common monetary policy regime
*   denotes the standard deviation of the variable x in country i, in the national monetary policy regime
6.3.2. Policy-Mix to Mitigate the Effects of Financial 
Heterogeneity
The previous results clearly show that a heterogeneous monetary union where the
central bank seeks to stabilize the union-wide inflation is not beneficial to all
member countries. More dangerously, because of structural asymmetries, this
monetary regime could be unfair, some members being systematically supported
to the detriment of others. National divergences widen in this case inside the
11 See BADARAU-SEMENESCU & LEVIEUGE, 2010b, for a discussion about the asymmetric transmission of a mone-
tary shock, or BADARAU-SEMENESCU & LEVIEUGE, 2011, for the analysis of financial shocks.
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union. The present paragraph analyses different monetary/budgetary strategies to
mitigate such negative effect of heterogeneity.
On the one hand, we consider an independent common Central Bank, like the
European Central Bank, whose policy is responsible for the price stability and
which does not cooperate with the national governments (in accordance with the
Article 130 of the Treaty of the European Union). On the other hand, decentral-
ized budgetary policies are conducted by the national governments. Alternative
strategies for the Central Bank (centralized or inflation divergences oriented) and
for the governments (budgetary cooperation or autonomous conduct of national
budgetary policies) are analyzed following a sequential game specific for the euro
area12. The Central Bank chooses first its strategy. National governments define
afterwards their policies.
Simple monetary and budgetary rules are optimized and evaluated in terms of
welfare gains, under each configuration.
The monetary policy rule to be optimized takes the form:   =
 where all variables are defined in deviation from their
steady state,   is the average inflation in the union   is the coefficient of
stabilization of the union-wide inflation and   is the smoothing coeffi-
cient of the nominal interest rate. The results for the numerical optimization are
the following: for   equal to 0.96, reference value for the euro area13, the opti-
mal coefficient   appears higher in the centralized strategy 
compared to the inflation divergences oriented strategy  . This
means that the centralized monetary policy is more reactive to symmetric shocks
than a policy taking into account the national information.
Given these optimal monetary decisions, national governments optimize their
budgetary decisions. We assume the following form of budgetary rules to be opti-
mized:  , where   is the deviation of the variable x from
its steady-state,   define national public expenditures, output and inflation
respectively.   are the stabilization coefficients of the budgetary rule, that
will be optimized under alternative (cooperative or non-cooperative) strategies.
The results of the numerical optimization are summarized in Tables 3, for given
values of the preference coefficients for the stabilization of output  , inflation
 and public expenditures   in the national loss functions14. These values
are identical for the two countries of the union, which are supposed to respect a
global orientation for the budgetary policy defined at the union-wide level. Such
global orientation, specified in the Treaty of Lisbon, but still unclearly defined, is
12 Details on the modeling of these two strategies are presented in BADARAU-SEMENESCU & LEVIEUGE, 2010b.
13 See SAUER & STURM, 2007, FOURÇANS & VRANCEANU, 2007 et LICHERON, 2009.
14 It should be underlined that the results of this analysis are robust to the modification of the preference coeffi-
cients, the values in Table 3 are just used for exemplification. See also BADARAU-SEMENESCU & LEVIEUGE,
2010b, for a more complete analysis including financial shocks equally.
it
β0it 1 – 1 β0 – () β 1πt +
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interpreted hereafter as a commitment of national governments to follow sym-
metric stabilization objectives for their budgetary policy. This institutional frame-
work can be seen as an implicit coordination mechanism that covers not only the
cooperative, but also the non-cooperative budgetary regime.
Table 3. Optimal budgetary rules under alternative regimes (for λπ = 1; λy = 1.5; λg = 0.5)
Whatever the monetary regime, the coefficients for inflation and output stabiliza-
tion in the non-cooperative budgetary regime are (as expected) negative. Taken in
absolute value, they are systematically lower in country 2 than in country 1. Pre-
cisely, in the calibration, country 1 was supposed to be more sensitive to shocks
because of the bank capital channel effectiveness. It thus needs more stabilization
by the budgetary policy, and it is exactly what the government does. With a sim-
ple non-cooperative budgetary regime, national governments could thus play an
active role in mitigating asymmetric transmission of shocks due to the structural
heterogeneity of the union.
In contrast with the non-cooperative regime, optimal cooperative budgetary rules
are not consistent with the stabilization needs of member countries (Table 3). The
coefficient associated to the inflation gap in the budgetary rule of country 2 is
positive, corresponding to a destabilizing effect of the government optimal
actions in this country. The result of Badarau-Semenescu et al. (2009) is useful to
explain that. They show that adopting the cooperative regime amounts for
national governments to optimize loss functions that incorporate simultaneously
centralized stabilization objectives and national divergences stabilization objec-
tives. Every member thus reacts to divergences in the union, making a step to











ρy 0.2 – =
ρπ 1.0881 – =
ρ*g 0.1465 =
ρ*y 0.1705 – =
ρ*π 0.7154 – =
ρg 0.1722 =
ρy 0.1880 – =
ρπ 1.5995 – =
ρ*g 0.6213 =
ρ*y 0.0592 – =
ρ*π 0.2519 =
ρg 0.2185 =
ρy 0.2018 – =
ρπ 1.0865 – =
ρ*g 0.1475 =
ρ*y 0.1723 – =
ρ*π 0.730 – =
ρg 0.1769 =
ρy 0.1897 – =
ρπ 0.5987 – =
ρ*g 0.6280 =
ρ*y 0.0624 – =
ρ*π 0.2566 =
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reach the average performance of the union. In the previous simulation, country 2
explicitly acts to reduce inflation divergences, even if this is detrimental to its
national stabilization15. So, the cooperative budgetary regime is not necessarily
suitable in an asymmetric monetary union. The need for responding to diver-
gences in inflation, output and public expenditures finally makes the individual
stabilizations less satisfying than in the non-cooperative regime.
This result becomes even more evident when comparing the expected social
losses, calculated, in Table 4, as the average of national losses within the union.
First, when the society shares the same stabilization preferences as the govern-
ments (first line in Table 4), the cooperative regime seems to be preferred to the
non-cooperative one.
Table 4. Expected social loss ratios for alternative policy-mixes (for λπ = 1; λy = 1.5; 
λg =0 . 5 )
*  = expected social loss with a centralized monetary policy;    = expected social loss with monetary policy
based on national information;   = expected social loss in a non-cooperative budgetary regime;    =
expected social loss in a cooperative budgetary regime. 
However, if we consider some degree of asymmetry between the social prefer-
ences and the governments’ preferences for stabilization (for instance if, unlike
governments, the society does not penalize public spending divergences), the
results clearly favors the non-cooperative regime over the cooperative one (sec-
ond line in Table 4)16. This means that the superiority of a cooperative regime
only relies on the fact that it allows a better stabilization of public spending diver-
gences. But, it is detrimental to the stabilization of national variables, costly at
national level, and so, more probably, unacceptable.
As for the monetary policy, it appears that a centralized monetary regime is pref-
erable to a monetary regime trying to reduce inflation divergences, for all values
of the social los functions coefficients (see the last column of Table 4). The policy-
mix analysis thus supports the current orientation of the European Central Bank
in the conduct of the common monetary policy.
15 See BADARAU-SEMENESCU & LEVIEUGE, 2010b, for further discussions on this point.
Social loss function coefficients (whatever the monetary 
regime)
(whatever the budgetary 
regime)
16 The question of divergences of preferences is not a main question per se in this paper. It just allows to deeply
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6.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The heterogeneity of the euro area is widely recognized and commented. The
persistence of inflation and output divergences since the beginning of the euro
area represented an important signal about the structural asymmetries among
European countries. But, the fast amplification of national divergences after the
recent subprime mortgage crisis really reasserts the structural heterogeneity of the
EMU. Given the key role of banks in the propagation of this crisis, a particular
attention is paid nowadays to the financial sector.
This study especially focuses on the financial heterogeneity in a monetary union.
It first studies the harmful effects of such heterogeneity and then wonders about
the policy-mix capacity to mitigate these effects in a monetary union. The analysis
relies on a DSGE model of a two-country monetary union with heterogeneous
bank capital channel, hit by symmetric monetary, budgetary or technological
shocks. It is found that financial asymmetries lead to striking cyclical divergences
among members of the Union. It is also shown that larger heterogeneity of the
Union implies larger cyclical divergences and that the conduct of a centralized
monetary policy worsens these divergences.
In terms of policy-mix, a centralized monetary policy, seeking to stabilize the
union-wide inflation rate would be preferable to a strategy that is simultaneously
concerned by the stabilization of inflation divergences in the union. The monetary
policy is thus not really an useful tool in mitigating national divergences induced
by financial heterogeneity. On the contrary, national budgetary policies constitute
relevant instruments to do it, fighting asymmetric transmission of shocks inside
the union. They should be accompanied by relevant coordination mechanisms,
such as a clear definition of a budgetary strategy for the union, specifying the
main objective to be followed by national governments. Compared to a non-
cooperative regime, the budgetary cooperation does not represent a better solu-
tion in the Union. Its superiority would only rely on the fact that it allows a better
stabilization of public spending divergences, which would be done to the detri-
ment of the stabilization of national variables. In euro area context, the model
thus supports the current orientation of the European Central Bank and empha-
sizes the importance of national fiscal policies face to structural heterogeneity of
the Union.
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7. THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE 
MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM: 
A CASE OF POLAND
Tomasz Łyziak1, Jan Przystupa2, Ewa Stanisławska3 and 
Ewa Wróbel4
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show implications of the current financial crisis for the
monetary transmission mechanism (MTM) and its effectiveness in Poland, which
is an inflation targeting emerging market economy. MTM depends on the mone-
tary policy, but also on structural features of the economy. Financial crisis could
affect both. Our results based on the Polish data suggest a change in the monetary
policy rule and a significant drop in the overall monetary policy effectiveness.
Unlike disturbances in the interest rate pass-through, which reflect increased per-
ception of risk and result from the financial crisis, the more pronounced role of
credit market imperfections and the weakening of the exchange rate channel can
be viewed rather as typical phenomena in the current phase of the business cycle.
However, the magnitude of the crisis, the likely changes in the regulatory frame-
work and adjustments in macroeconomic policies can result in a deeper evolution
of the MTM.
Keywords: Monetary transmission, emerging economy, financial crisis
JEL Codes?/Classification numbers: E51, E52, G01
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7.1. INTRODUCTION
Monetary transmission has recently gained a new wave of interest (e.g. Boivin et
al. (2010), Cecioni and Neri (2010)). There is also a growing number of papers
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addressing a question of an impact of the current financial crisis on the monetary
transmission (e.g. Peersman (2010), showing that in the euro area the use of
unconventional monetary policy, e.g. fixed rate full allotment, offset a negative
impact of the turmoil and preserved monetary transmission from a substantial
disruption.
The evidence for emerging market economies is scant. We would like to fill this
gap – the aim of this paper is to show implications of the current financial crisis
for the monetary transmission mechanism and its effectiveness in Poland, which
is inflation targeting emerging market economy. After the Lehman Brothers
default Poland changed its monetary policy from short-term interest rate control
to liquidity management and a more pronounced role of output stabilization.
However, in contrast to the euro area, US or the UK, it did not use unconventional
monetary policy tools and relied on a traditional set complemented with foreign
currency swaps.
Poland has both standard and non-standard features of an emerging market econ-
omy. Emerging markets are usually open economies with less developed financial
sector, but on the other hand, they depend heavily on foreign capital. Thus,
exchange rate usually plays a significant role in their transmission mechanism.
Poland is less financially and trade open than other European emerging markets;
on the other hand, it is a significant recipient of funds related to the European
Union’s Cohesion Policy. Therefore, financial crisis in Poland may manifest itself
in a somewhat different way and can have different outcomes comparing both
developed economies and emerging markets.
During financial crisis, increased global uncertainty caused massive capital out-
flows and these in turn led to a rapid depreciation of domestic currencies. The
impact of depreciation can be twofold: on one hand, increasing competitiveness
it can stimulate output, but on the other – dampen real sector activity via credit
channel. Depreciations lead to a deterioration in borrowers’ balance sheets, espe-
cially in dollarized economies and when central bank credibility is low (Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2004)). Tornell and Westermann (2002) stress that in the
middle income countries, the balance sheet effect and depreciations mostly affect
non-tradable sector, which is more bank dependant than the tradable sector. In
Poland, the exchange rate depreciation rather sustained than depressed domestic
demand. There are at least three underlying reasons: (i) the share of corporate
sector debt denominated in foreign currencies is relatively low – it amounts to
25%. Balance sheets of the corporate sector, though affected by exchange rate
impact on loans, seemed to suffer more from firms’ involvement in speculations
on further exchange rate appreciation (options); (ii) the aforementioned broader
indicator, i.e. the level of financial openness of Poland, measured as gross stocks
of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, which in 2008 reached the level of
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116.6%, remains relatively low comparing to either Czech Republic (147.4%) or
Hungary (173.5%), let alone the euro area (264.5%); (iii) central bank credibil-
ity, though not very high, increases steadily (Łyziak et al. (2007)).
Financial crisis and exogenous negative demand shock led to an exceptionally
deep contraction in the real sector in many emerging markets. Poland did not
experience a formal recession – GDP growth remained low but positive. None-
theless, various measures of output gap were negative and big in absolute terms.
As suggested by Adrian et al. (2010), the role of the interest rate spread or output
gap may vary across different phases of the business cycle. While during reces-
sions the relationship between inflation and demand is close to linear as labour
market is relatively competitive, during expansions capacities are utilized at high
levels and increasing them is costly (constraint capacity models). Thus, inflation
becomes more sensitive to demand pressure. There is also some evidence that
exchange rate pass through and interest rate pass-through may display asym-
metries over business cycle (Correa and Minella (2006), Przystupa, Wróbel
(2010), Chmielewski, (2003)). We try to shed some light on the role of cyclical
factors in the monetary transmission disturbances observed during financial cri-
sis.
The paper is structured as follows. We start with a description of monetary and
government policies during financial crisis. The next section provides empirical
results, the last one concludes. Figures and tables are displayed in the Appendix.
7.2. MONETARY AND OTHER POLICIES DURING FINANCIAL 
CRISIS
Facing a sharp increase in uncertainty and turbulences in foreign and domestic
financial markets, a fall in the unsecured transactions and a significant increase
in cash holdings of households, central bank which prior to the crisis focused on
controlling the overnight money market interest rate (Polonia), put into place
various measures aimed at liquidity management. Financial crisis induced a tran-
sitory change in the monetary policy, but unlike the ECB or Bank of England, the
National Bank of Poland used only standard monetary policy instruments.
As shown in Fig. 1, there was a clear-cut fall in the interbank overnight transac-
tions in October 2008. They remained subdued throughout 2009 and started to
rebuild only in 2010. A downward trend in the overnight transactions began in
the first half of 2008, well before the Lehman Brothers collapse. Then, the central
bank tightened monetary policy owing to inflation exceeding the targeted level of
2.5%. It is therefore understandable that lower free reserves led to a lower level
of interbank transactions. Starting from November 2008 NBP gradually lowered
its interest rate from 6% to 3.5% in June 2009.
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Slightly before, in mid-October 2008, NBP introduced Confidence Package, i.e.
a set of measures aimed at providing banks with liquidity in domestic and foreign
currencies and at expanding possibilities for banks to obtain liquidity by broad-
ening collateral in operations with the NBP. As in many emerging markets,
Poland’s banking sector exhibits structural excess liquidity. During financial crisis
it alleviated but not eliminated negative effects of the confidence loss. Responding
to banking sector demand, NBP added liquidity for maturities up to 6 months,
whereas through swaps it provided foreign currencies. The latter operations were
mostly used by domestically-owned banks which found it difficult to finance
themselves in foreign markets, opposite to these which could be financed by their
mother-institutions.
In addition, in January 2009, NBP pursued an earlier redemption of its 10-year
bond, issued in 2002 to absorb structural surplus liquidity. Finally, in May 2009
central bank reduced the reserve requirement ratio from 3.5% to 3%.
The provision of liquidity drove short-term rates in the unsecured market to the
levels below the NBP’s policy rate (the reference rate). On the other hand, it
helped reappearing of transactions, but mainly for maturities up to one week.
This is well illustrated by spread behaviour (Fig. 2). Spreads between interest
rates of various maturities and Polonia rocketed first at the end of 2007 reflecting
disturbances in the world markets due to the first stage of the subprime crisis.
This was a transitory phenomenon and then spreads went down. They increased
sharply once again after the Lehman Brothers failure. Their increased level per-
sisted in 2009, but while this between Wibor1W and Polonia stabilised, those
between Polonia and longer rates got even larger. This is especially visible in the
case of Wibor3M, even though this rate to some extent is impacted by the central
bank’s repo operations.
Government policies addressed to tackle disturbances the financial crisis brought
about, involved four groups of measures. The first one was supposed to stabilise
the banking sector through extension of household deposit guarantees and a pos-
sibility of getting a transitory state aid in mortgage debt repayment for those who
got unemployed due to the financial crisis. The second group was aimed at
exchange rate stabilisation, which was depreciating, driven by contagion effects.
Thus, the government exchanged the inflowing EU related funds in the foreign
exchange market, instead of doing it at the central bank window. Moreover, the
government and the central bank arranged an access to the Flexible Credit Line
(FCL) offered by the IMF. Foreign investors treated the credit line as an additional
insurance of macroeconomic stability or the country collateral. Thus, the FCL
reduced credit constraints, which in the case of emerging markets exist on both
firm and country levels (Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004)) and made the
credit channel operation closer to the way characteristic for developed econo-
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mies. The third group was to sustain domestic demand and involved a faster use
of EU funds, loans from the EIB and the World Bank. Also, small and medium
size enterprises were offered credit guarantees. Finally, the last group was sup-
posed to increase flexibility of the economy, and labour market in particular.
Under auspices of the government, employers and trade unions agreed to enhance
flexibility of working time and, by the same token, diminish lay-offs during peri-
ods of lower demand.
7.3. ESTIMATION METHOD
Our sample starts in 1998 with the adoption of inflation targeting by the central
bank and ends in May 2010. In the second half of 2010 the most pronounced
symptoms of the financial crisis lost their momentum. In what follows, we com-
pare results obtained from a sub-sample ending before Lehman Brothers collapse
in September 2008 with these from the whole sample.
In our estimations we use a suite of structural VAR and EC models. To account
for a possible regime shift and a resulting parameter instability, we introduce a
dummy which is zero in the period before September 2008 and 1 thereafter. The
results are presented both with and without the dummy, since it seems that it
captures not only effects of the financial crisis, but also these of the business cycle.
To analyse interest rate pass-through from money market to retail rates and check
whether it underwent changes resulting from the financial crisis, we use a follow-
ing model:
where rt is a respective retail deposit or loan rate, mrt stands for a money market
rate (either 1- or 3-month Wibor), ∆ is a first difference of a variable, whereas α0,
α1, β1, β2 are parameters, and β1 < 0. Coefficient α1 shows the instantaneous
adjustment of the retail rate to the money market rate, while β2 measures the
long-term adjustment. We compare forecasts of selected retail rates obtained
from models estimated on the sample ending before the Lehman Brothers collapse
with the actual data. A difference between the two shows the impact of the crisis.
We employ data on both outstanding amounts (stocks) and new deposits/loans
(flows5). In this case, due to a change in the method of retail rates calculation, the
sample is much shorter, starting from the year 2005.
Next stages of the monetary transmission are examined with structural VAR
models in the spirit of Peersman and Smets (2003). In the benchmark model we
use four macroeconomic variables – prices (CPI), industrial output, short-term
5 In the statistics they are dubbed “new businesses”.
∆t
r α0 α1∆mrt β1 rt 1 – β2mrt 1 – – () ε t ++ + =
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interest rate (1-month money market interest rate, Wibor1M – serving as a proxy
for the policy rate), and the nominal effective exchange rate. Foreign interest rate
(Euribor) is plugged exogenously. To extract monetary policy shock we employ a
recursive (Choleski) factorization. The variables are ordered in a way reflecting
the assumption of a lag between monetary policy shock and the reaction of the
real sector and prices. The specification reflects also monetary policy rule: central
bank sets the level of its instrument (interest rate) observing current developments
in inflation and the real sector. To gain more insights from the VAR analysis, we
add to the benchmark specification various credit aggregates, including these
denominated in foreign currencies. This brings more evidence whether – as in
developed economies – credit played a significant role in the propagation of
financial crisis.
The number of lags was determined taking into account information criteria, but
also model stability and serial correlation of residuals. All variables except the
interest rates are in natural logarithms and are seasonally adjusted. If necessary,
we also use centred seasonal dummies to eliminate the remaining seasonality and
autocorrelation of residuals. The VAR models are estimated in levels to allow for
the long-run relationships between variables. The key variables are reproduced in
Fig. 1 and Fig. 3.
Basing on our VAR models with determined optimal lags, we calculate monetary
transmission effectiveness (MTE), understood as a standardized elasticity
( ) between instrumental (y1) and target (y2) variables with intermediation
of the yA variable from the transmission chain:
,
where:
if the parameters at respective variables are significant at the pv level and fulfil
Wald restriction tests (see e.g. Bates and Vaugirard (2009)). MTE is a product of
the elasticity   multiplied by the respective pv. To calculate the dynamic
MTE, our VAR models were reestimated for the optimal lag + 1. This overparam-
eterization allows for using the OLS estimator (Harvey (1991).
To account for the role of cyclical factors in disturbances of the monetary trans-
mission, we conduct simulations on a small structural model with credit market
imperfections.
ey2 y1 yA , ⁄
MTEy1 y2 yA , → 1 pvA 1 , – () 1 pv2 A , – ()
ey2 y1 yA , ⁄
1 ey2 y1 yA , ⁄ + ()
------------------------------------ =
ey2 y1 yA , ⁄ ey2 yA ⁄ eyA y1 ⁄ ⋅ =
ey2 y1 yA , ⁄
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The open economy IS curve is:
(1)
where y is the output gap, rl is the real and il is the nominal rate of interest on
loans, i is the money market rate, e is the real effective exchange rate, and yEUR is
the GDP growth in the euro area, the main trade partner of Poland. In the model
a change of spread affects aggregate demand. Moreover, the spread is endogen-
ised to account for its cyclical fluctuations and forward-lookingness. It depends
on the future output gap – banks expecting deterioration in the economic activity
perceive it as a risk and increase the spread.
The exchange rate equation, expressed in terms of the nominal effective exchange
rate (s), is a behavioural equation, although in the spirit of the UIP condition. It
depends on its lag and lead, the differential between domestic and foreign (if)
short-term interest rates and the future output gap:
(2)
The Phillips curve (in terms of core inflation,  ) is explained by inflation expec-
tations ( ), proxied by consumer survey-based measures, the output gap and the
real effective exchange rate:
(3)
In the principal version of the model the relationship between the output gap and
inflation is linear. For periods of prosperity we impose non-linearities in the way
suggested by Alichi et al. (2009), implying that the impact of the output gap on
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7.4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
7.4.1. Disturbances in the Monetary Transmission
In line with the literature, we assume that banks are price takers in the money
market and price setters in the case of retail rates – banks set retail rates with
respect to the money market rates of corresponding maturities. Jobst and Kwapil
(2008) point, however, that money market rates serve well as a proxy for the
marginal cost in periods of calm, whereas in time of crisis this is not ensured.
During the crisis banks had problems with fund raising in capital and money
markets. And if they aim for a certain proportionality between the components
when managing their liabilities, then diverging cost developments may result in
marginal cost no longer being represented by money market rates alone. More-
over, retail rates can be affected by structural factors, like competition and devel-
opment of the capital market. In this study we do not discuss the latter problem,
since we suppose that structural factors do not differ much in the two samples we
consider. Bearing in mind the scale of disturbances in the money market, we con-
centrate on the pure pass-through process.
Before financial crisis, loan and deposit rates moved broadly in line with the mar-
ket rates. There was some sluggishness in their adjustment to the market rates –
notably in the case of loans for consumption, i.e. for loans which have poorer
collateral than others. In many cases, the long-run adjustment to the money mar-
ket rate was lower than one. The speed of adjustment varied from less than one
month to about four months in the case of loans for households’ consumption.
In the aftermath of the crisis, some long-run relationships between money market
and retail rates broke down. In particular this is true for households’ deposits
(new businesses) of maturities longer than one month and up to six months. An
increase in uncertainty and the aforementioned problems with fund raising led
banks to offer deposit rates exceeding Wibor3M, i.e. the rate treated as a bench-
mark for the retail rates. This was most pronounced in the first quarter of 2009,
when negative spread between Wibor3M and deposit rates amounted to 1.4-1.5
percentage points; since then it gradually fell to 0.4-0.5 percentage points. Rates
on firms’ new deposits displayed similar disturbances. The long-run relationships
of these of maturities exceeding three months up to six months seem to disappear.
Forecasts of deposit rates suggest that banks have been awash with the short-term
liquidity (up to 1 month), namely forecasted rates tend to be much higher than
actually observed. In contrast, these of longer maturities are much lower than the
actual (Fig. 4).
Interest rate pass-through from money market to retail loan rates for households
has also displayed disturbances. The long-run relationship between Wibor and
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the rate on loans for house purchases (new businesses), on loans for sole propri-
etors (i.e. the owners of small firms) and consumption broke down. Forecasted
loan rates both for housing and on loans to the sole proprietors are much lower
than these actually observed, showing the degree of risk attributed by banks to
these types of loans and borrowers (Fig. 4). Interest rate pass-through to rates on
loans to firms (both stocks and flows) displays less changes. As a rule, the long-
term relationships still operate. The actual average rate on new loans to the cor-
porate sector tends to exceed the forecast since the beginning of 2010, but a dif-
ference between the two is much smaller than this for household’s housing pur-
poses and sole proprietors (Fig. 4). Our results suggest that in the aftermath of
the crisis banks tended to reduce loans for housing and consumption, as well as
for micro-firms rather than for the corporate sector. This is consistent with imper-
fect information hypothesis: small firms (but also households) are particularly
vulnerable to credit market disruptions.
So far we have discussed the impact of financial disintermediation on retail rates
in the banking system. It is however worthwhile to compare average interest rate
on loans and deposits with the real sector activity. Fig. 5 shows that the spread,
which displayed an upward trend since mid-2005, rocketed in the aftermath of
the Lehman Brothers collapse to fall sharply to the pre-crisis level in mid-2010. It
also reveals that the strong upward movement coincided with a sharp fall of the
output gap6 and persisted as long as the output gap was highly negative. Spread
behaviour reflected risk attributed by banks to the real sector. The increase in
spreads resulted not only from the turmoil in the money market, but also from
the expected production drop. This suggests that monetary policy actions aimed
at reduction of spreads could have only limited impact.
Assuming that there was a regime change in the monetary policy, central bank’s
reaction function (policy rule) obtained from our VAR model is – at first sight –
similar in both samples. The reaction to the domestic demand shock is slightly
bigger in the long sample than in the short one, whereas the reaction to the price
shock does not display any change (Fig. 5, Fig. 6 upper panel shows the response
of the interest rate to the domestic demand shock). Dropping this assumption we
obtain a considerably bigger response to both shocks. However, while before the
crisis the reactions of the interest rate to the domestic demand shock were statis-
tically insignificant, in the sample including data after Lehman Brothers collapse,
they are significant. Our tentative explanation is that facing a risk of a severe
output decline and disturbances in the interest rate pass-through and credit chan-
nel operation, central bank reacted to inflation and especially to output shocks
more than in the past. Other empirical results (Fig. 5 and Fig. 6) show that the
monetary transmission is somewhat slower – assuming the regime shift – the
6 De-trended industrial production.
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maximum reaction of prices to the interest rate shock appears 3 months later than
in the past, but the magnitude of the reaction is very similar. As expected, reac-
tions obtained without the dummy exhibit longer lags. The reaction of prices to
the exchange rate shock under the assumption of a regime shift tends to be more
prolonged than before the crisis. If, once again, we drop this assumption, the
pass-through is smaller and faster. The difference between the two responses can
be due to cyclical factors. Przystupa and Wróbel (2010) show that the exchange
rate pass-through is asymmetric over the business cycle and tends to be the small-
est during early recessions. Thus, the dummy effect may encompass not only the
increased uncertainty and changes in the monetary policy, but also cyclical fluc-
tuations.
Prices seem to be more flexible with respect to the domestic demand than before
the crisis. With the dummy the effect is small, whereas much bigger without it.
Bearing in mind the global character of the crisis and the scale of output drop in
the EU and the US, we argue that facing adverse conditions, producers were
slightly more than usually willing to adjust their prices to a fall in demand. Also,
the reaction of the nominal effective exchange rate to the shock in output, which
can be interpreted as a positive shock to the economic fundamentals, brings about
appreciation which is less persistent than in the past. Thus, it seems that the finan-
cial crisis induced more volatility into the foreign exchange market. The reaction
of output to both the interest rate shock and exchange rate shock is slightly
smaller than before the financial crisis. In this case the dummy does not change
the responses (Fig. 7).
In the wake of the financial crisis domestic currency loans for households display
practically the same reaction to the interest rate shock as before (Fig. 8)7. In this
group of loans, only these to sole proprietors seem to exhibit more downward
movement in the longer sample. This could suggest that banks perceived loans for
these small entities as relatively risky. The reaction of the corporate sector loans
(Fig. 9) in the longer sample is unchanged over the period of first 15 months after
the shock and only afterwards some differences begin to develop. Both overdraft
and loans of maturity exceeding one year (serving here as a proxy for investment
loans) exhibit initially slower and smaller (overdraft) reaction to the interest rate
shock than before the crisis. This can reflect the fact that during financial crisis
banks lengthened the interest rate adjustment period. The more rigid reaction of
the overdraft to the interest rate shock can be also due to an increase in demand
for such loans. On the other hand, tightening of loan conditions for small and
medium size enterprises could have a negative impact. It is noteworthy that in the
7 Dummy variable was insignificant in the case of all credit variables but loans in foreign currencies to the corpo-
rate sector. Relatively high variability of loans in Poland since 1999 seems to be the underlying reason (see
Fig. 3), therefore reactions of loans denominated in the domestic currency are displayed only for the specifica-
tion excluding the dummy.
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longer sample total amount of household and corporate sector loans (up to 17-
18 months after the shock) exhibits the reaction pattern similar to that before the
collapse of Lehman Brothers. Thus, we conclude that banks simultaneously used
in a more active way instruments other than interest rates to affect loan supply,
setting tighter standards and conditions8.
In the case of loans denominated in foreign currencies to households9 and corpo-
rate sector, we discuss impulse responses to the (domestic) interest rate shock
only. Exchange rate shock seems to induce mostly the accounting effect. After
monetary tightening, both before and after the crisis corporate sector tends to
increase its debt in foreign currencies (Fig. 10), since this in the domestic currency
becomes relatively more expensive. The effect is somewhat bigger in the longer
sample and is statistically significant. Loans in foreign currencies to private per-
sons do not change in response to the monetary policy shock (thus we even do
not reproduce them in the graph), whereas these to sole proprietors display a
similar pattern as loans to the corporate sector. Thus, in the sample including
financial crisis data, loans in foreign currencies to the corporate sector and sole
proprietors seem to be more responsive to the monetary policy shocks. It should
be stressed however, that in both samples they clearly weaken monetary transmis-
sion.
7.4.2. Effectiveness of the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism. Impact of Cyclical Factors
The efficiency of the monetary policy depends on its credibility and effectiveness
of the monetary transmission mechanism. The effectiveness may change over time
and tends to be impacted by both structural shocks and cyclical behaviour of the
economy.
Monetary policy effectiveness, defined as in Section 3, indicates that the exchange
rate has been the most efficient channel among these included in our VAR model,
i.e. interest rate, exchange rate, and credit channel (Fig. 11). In the wake of the
8 Our setting of the VAR does not allow us to draw hard conclusions on credit channel operation, since we do
not disentangle between loan supply and demand. Senior Loan Officer Opinion Surveys (SLOOS), conducted
by the NBP on quarterly basis, involve questions on both demand and supply. SLOOS show that banks aimed
at reducing loans for housing and consumption. As we discussed before, the former are mostly extended in
foreign currencies. Also, loan officers report that demand for consumer loans was slightly falling in the first half
of 2009 but then started to increase. In the case of loans extended to the corporate sector, banks report to tighten
standards and conditions with respect to the supply of short-term (of maturity up to 1 year) and long-term loans
(of maturity exceeding 1 year) in the same way. The standards and conditions were tightened more for small
and medium size enterprises than for the big ones. On the other hand, loan officers reported a more pronounced
fall in demand for long-term than for short-term loans, suggesting that firms abandoned investment plans,
whereas they tried to find financing for the working capital, inventories and debt restructuring.
Our results are broadly consistent with the SLOOS, with exception of loans to the corporate sector of maturity
exceeding one year.
9 Over the period 2004-2010 loans denominated in foreign currencies for sole proprietors accounted only for
about 2.5-10% of the total amount of such loans extended to households.
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financial crisis, its effectiveness dropped by one third. However, the effect seems
to be transitory – since July 2009 the effectiveness has been increasing. Similarly,
between the third quarter of 2008 and the first quarter 2010, effectiveness of the
interest rate decreased by almost 20% and remains subdued, presumably reflect-
ing a temporary change in the NBP’s monetary policy (a shift from the interest
rate control to the liquidity management) and an effect of the economic slow-
down with a fall of investment and credit use. This would also suggest a transi-
tory fall of the effectiveness. The level of the indicator of the credit channel effec-
tiveness is twice lower than this of the interest rate, but its reaction to the financial
crisis is bigger, suggesting a significant squeeze of credit supply. Though in our
setting it is impossible to disentangle credit supply and demand, we suspect that
while the first drop of the effectiveness was probably due to tightening of credit
conditions, the second one, in mid-2009, is rather a result of a lower demand (see
e.g. Del Giovane et al. (2010)).
To trace the cyclical features of our indicators, we compare them with the output
gap10, leaving however apart a big drop of the exchange rate efficiency in 2001
and a parallel increase of that of the interest rate, since they were clearly due to
changes in the monetary policy (exchange rate liberalization, inflation targeting
adoption). In contrast to Chmielewski (2003) who found some evidence of an
asymmetric interest rate pass-through across the business cycle in Poland on the
bank-level data, we do not observe on the macro level any significant asym-
metries in the interest rate channel efficiency.
However, we find that the exchange rate efficiency tends to fall during recessions
and remains stable during expansions. It may result from a low exchange rate
pass-through to consumption prices in the early and middle stage of recession,
when enterprises expecting lower profits cut costs (see Przystupa and Wróbel
(2010) for details). Then, the slope of the Phillips curve becomes less steep (enter-
prises are more reluctant to raise prices than to lower them, see e.g. Filardo
(1998)). In the early expansion, the convex Phillips curve is combined with a high
pass-through effect. The same phenomenon, although due to the opposite reac-
tion, can be observed in the late expansion, when the concave Phillips curve is
combined with a lower pass-through. That is, during a recovery the effectiveness
of the exchange rate channel may slightly increase or remain constant. Analyti-
cally this can be described by a two-leaf clover curve drawn by a segment moving
in the rectangular coordinates along the horizontal coordinate (output gap) and
the vertical one (inflation gap, i.e. difference between current and target inflation)
– Fig. 11. The segment may be interpreted as a long-run path of the GDP growth
rate expressed in nominal terms.
10 As before, de-trended industrial production.
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To develop further the role of the business cycle phase for the effectiveness of the
monetary transmission mechanism we used linear and non-linear versions of the
structural model described in Section 3. In the non-linear model the estimated
direct impact of the output gap on net inflation varies from 0.13 in the case of a
non-negative output gap to 0.42 in the case of the output gap significantly posi-
tive (the highest value observed in the sample). In the linear version of the model
the direct impact of the output gap on net inflation is 0.28. To analyse main
features of the monetary transmission mechanism we analyse results of the simu-
lations, in which the short-term interest rate increases or decreases by 1 pp. for
4 quarters and then it returns to the baseline. Due to non-linear effects of the
output gap on inflation simulations are conducted for different initial values of
the output gap. Table 1 summarizes the results.
Simulations based on the non-linear model support previous evidence of the
impact of the business cycle on the monetary transmission mechanism. The max-
imum inflation response to the interest rate increase varies between -0.37 pp. in
the case of non-positive output gaps to 0.59 pp. in the case of the actual output
being 4.5% higher than the potential output. A reduction of interest rates leads
to outcomes even more diversified: inflation increases by 0.37 pp. for a non-pos-
itive output gap and by 0.68 pp. for a highly positive output gap.
The operation of the monetary transmission mechanism is different in both ver-
sions of the model. Capturing non-linear effects in the monetary transmission
mechanism makes inflation response to the interest rate impulse less persistent.
For the initial levels of the output gap not sizeably higher than 0.03 the maximum
inflation response in the linear model is stronger, although more delayed than in
the non-linear one. In the periods of economic boom and the output gap
approaching its highest observed value, the maximum response is significantly
higher than in the linear version of the model and occurs with the same delay.
7.5. CONCLUSIONS
The paper shows implications of the current financial crisis for the monetary
transmission mechanism in an emerging market economy. The transmission
mechanism crucially depends on the monetary policy and structural features of
the economy. Financial crisis could potentially affect both. In its sharp phase,
many central banks changed their monetary policy from short-term interest rate
control to liquidity management. Some of them resorted to non-conventional
instruments. In the case of Poland, which used only standard tools, we find some
support for the hypothesis of a change in the monetary policy rule. Facing a risk
of a severe output decline central bank apparently took into account possible
disturbances in the interest rate pass-through as well as in credit channel opera-
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tion and increased its responsiveness to both inflation and output shocks. Reac-
tions of inflation and industrial output to the interest rate and exchange rate
shocks display minor changes.
Increase of uncertainty in the money market and the real sector brought about
problems with transmission from the monetary policy instrument to money mar-
ket and retail rates. A breakdown of the long-term relationships concerned
mostly deposits of households, loans for housing and consumption, as well as
these to sole proprietors. We show a significant gap between actually observed
and forecasted retail interest rates. Apart from deposits of one month maturity,
which tend to be lower than the forecast due to liquidity provision by the central
bank and smaller risk in this segment of the market, interest rate on other deposits
and loans are higher than forecasted. It should be stressed, that this concerns
much less loans for the corporate sector than these for households’ consumption
and housing, and especially loans for sole proprietors. This corresponds to the
results obtained from a structural VAR, showing a bigger than in the pre-crisis
period reaction of loans to sole proprietors to the monetary policy shock.
What is specific for emerging market economies, it is a significant role of the
exchange rate in the transmission mechanism and the fact that the increased glo-
bal uncertainty caused massive capital outflows. In the case of Poland we do not
find evidence that it significantly hampered output via credit channel. Though
our setting does not allow us to draw hard conclusions on credit channel opera-
tion, we observe that after the crisis reactions of loans to small entities became
deeper, what is consistent with credit channel and asymmetric information liter-
ature.
Our results suggest a significant drop in the overall monetary policy effectiveness
since the fourth quarter 2008 and a slight improvement at the end of 2009. The
increased role of credit market imperfections and the weakening of the exchange
rate channel can be viewed as typical phenomena in the current phase of the
business cycle. There is some evidence that the latter tends to fall during recession
and remains stable during expansion.
All in all, it seems that apart from the interest rate pass-through disturbances in
the monetary policy transmission rather reflect increased perception of risk and
cyclical features of the transmission process activated by the financial crisis and
to a much smaller extent structural changes in the economy. The magnitude of the
crisis, its duration and evolution, as well as the likely adjustments of the regula-
tory framework and in the macroeconomic policies can lead to changes in the
behaviour of economic agents and result in the evolution of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. The learning process of economic agents – consumers, pro-
ducers and the banking sector will exert a significant impact.
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Figure 2. Spreads between 3 month money market rate (WIBOR 3M), the overnight rate 
(POLONIA) and the NBP reference rate
Source: Authors’ calculations. Data: NBP and Reuters.
Figure 3. Main variables used in the estimation: industrial output (y/y), NEER, loans in 
the domestic currency to households – total amount(y/y), to the sole proprietors (y/y), to 
the corporate sector – total amount (y/y), of maturity over 1Y (y/y) and overdraft (y/y)
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Figure 4. Selected actual and forecasted new deposit and loan retail rates (upper panel 
from left to right - households’ deposits – 1M, 6M, 12M; lower panel from left to right - 
loans to the corporate sector, loans to households for housing purposes, loans to the sole 
proprietors)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 7: Response functions: domestic demand shock
Source: Authors’ calculations.
















































































5 10 15 20 25 30 35
i_08==>sole_prop_08
i_10==>sole_prop_10
SUERF2011_3.book  Page 100  Friday, October 21, 2011  9:17 AMTHE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM 101
larcier
Figure 9. Response functions of loans (domestic currency) to the corporate sector (interest 
rate shock): total, overdraft, loans of maturity up to 1 year and exceeding one year 
(“investment”)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 11. Monetary transmission effectiveness (transmission to CPI)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 1. Maximum inflation response [delay (in quarters)] after the interest rate impulse 
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8. EFFECTIVENESS OF UNCONVENTIONAL 




Unconventional monetary policies seemed to be the isolated experiment run by
the Bank of Japan during the deflation period. However, recent financial crisis
made it clear that the conventional monetary policy – the interest rates setting –
is no longer enough to bring back the financial stability and economic recovery.
In fact, when the interest rate is close to zero and the transmission from the central
bank rates to other short-term rates is impaired, the central banks need to imple-
ment new policy tools. In this paper I review the evidence on the effectiveness of
the unconventional monetary policies implemented in the United States during
the 2007-2010 crisis and on their impact on long-term inflation expectations. I
compare the previous findings with my results (Szczerbowicz, 2011).
Keywords: unconventional monetary policy, inflation expectations, long-term
interest rates, Libor-OIS spread
8.1. INTRODUCTION
Setting the central bank interest rate according to the current economic situation
has been proved effective as the standard monetary policy transmission channel.
The models in which the interest rate rule characterizes the monetary policy are
commonly used by researchers and central bankers. However, the recent financial
crisis and subsequent economic recession showed the limits of conventional mon-
etary policy. Indeed, interest rate setting has been confronted so far with two
major difficulties: zero interest rate environment and impaired transmission from
the central bank rates to other short-term rates.
There exist several alternatives to conventional monetary policy. Bernanke, Rein-
hart and Sack (2004) classify unconventional monetary policies into three groups:
1) expectation management strategy. Central bank commitments can affect the
expectations of the future interest rates;
2) expansion of monetary base. When the financial frictions are present the
quantitative easing is non-neutral. Money and other financial assets are no
longer perfect substitutes. Agents want to trade money for non-money assets,
1 LUISS Guido Carli and Sciences-Po, OFCE. E-mail: szczerbowicz@hotmail.com.
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and therefore the prices of non-monetary assets raise and the yields go down
which stimulates the economy;
3) changes in the composition of the central bank balance sheet. Credit easing
changes the composition of the portfolio of securities left in the hands of the
private sector and can substantially affect their yields.
The Bank of Japan was the first to implement unconventional monetary policies
during the prolonged stagnation following the burst of the asset price bubble in
the early 1990s. During that period, it also faced some serious deflationary pres-
sure for about a decade. The negative inflation rates measured by the consumer
price index (CPI) change first appeared in 1998 and lasted until the autumn 2005.
To counteract the deflationary pressure, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) adopted various
unconventional policies. First, in 1995, the BOJ lowered the target of the uncol-
lateralized overnight call rate from around 1.75 percent to 0.5 percent. Second,
the BOJ decided to encourage the uncollateralized call rate to be at about zero
percent in February 1999. This was the introduction of the so-called “zero inter-
est rate policy (ZIRP).” Afterwards, at the BOJ governor’s press conference in
April 1999, it was declared that the ZIRP would be continued until deflationary
concerns were dispelled. Third, in March 2001 the BOJ adopted “quantitative
easing monetary policy (QMEP)” with a large expansion of the monetary base.
In doing so, the BOJ had also made a commitment to maintain this policy pack-
age until the core CPI inflation rate registered zero percent or higher on a sustain-
able basis. The QMEP framework included employing by the BOJ the outstand-
ing balance of its current account as an operating target for monetary market
operations. In addition, it was also declared that the BOJ was ready to increase
the purchase of long-term government bonds if necessary to provide ample liquid-
ity. The QMEP was exited in March 2006 when the conditions for the exit had
been satisfied, i.e. both the development of actual inflation rate and outlook of
inflation rate were above zero percent.
Since the beginning of the 2007-2010 crisis other central banks have also
switched to alternative monetary tools. The generalized uncertainty regarding the
healthiness of bank balance sheets generated frictions in the financial and mone-
tary markets. In that context, lowering the central bank interest rates did not
affect the interbank rates to the extent it used to do. As a consequence, the mon-
etary policy remained unable to lower the cost of credit. The Federal Reserve
responded to this problem in a number of ways. First of all, it introduced new
liquidity facilities. It also expanded the maturities and range of eligible collateral,
the frequency of operations and the number of counter-parties. As the crisis got
worse, especially after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the unconventional mon-
etary policies were implemented even more intensively. The Fed started its inter-
ventions in specific market segments and initiated the asset purchase programs
including commercial papers, agency debt and MBS as well as longer-term gov-
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ernment debt. The Fed also conceded swap lines to other central banks to enable
them to provide further dollar liquidity. Figure 1 illustrates the way the uncon-
ventional policies affected the Fed’s balance sheet. Since the beginning of the crisis
the composition of the Fed’s assets was significantly altered and the size of the
balance sheet more than doubled.
Figure 1: Fed’s Assets
In this paper I review the evidence on the effectiveness of the unconventional
monetary policies implemented in the United States during the 2007-2010 crisis
and on their impact on long-term inflation expectations. I compare the previous
findings with the results of my paper (Szczerbowicz, 2011). I focus on the effec-
tiveness of unconventional policies in lowering the long-term interest rates and
relieving the strains on the US money markets as these aspects were essential in
stimulating economy in the context of the crisis. Indeed, when short-term interest
rates are close to zero, the Fed can still stimulate the aggregate demand by reduc-
ing the long-term rates. On the other hand, reducing tension on interbank market
allows financial institutions to extend credit and therefore counters the recession.
Apart from efficacy, unconventional monetary policies brought another impor-
tant question: their impact on long-term inflation expectations. In principle, rais-
ing inflation expectations was not an objective of the Federal Reserve and
throughout the crisis the importance of price stability was emphasized. Also, as
Figure 2 shows, the monetary base expansion did not have impact on broader
money aggregates (M1, M2). However, there are several reasons to think that the
unconventional monetary policies might affect the anchorage of the long-run
inflations expectations. First, expansion of monetary base can encourage doubts
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about the central bank’s capacity to absorb the excessive liquidity once the crisis
is overcome. Second, without explicit announcement of future tax increase or
expenditure reduction, agents might expect the growing public debt to be mone-
tized. Also, the central banks’ purchases of risky assets moved some risk onto
them. Possible credit losses would diminish the Treasury budget and could
encourage some political pressure. The independence of the Federal Reserve
might be threatened. These concerns have become even stronger since the Fed
started Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2).
Figure 2: M2, M1 and monetary base in the US
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section I
describe the unconventional monetary policies implemented in the United States
during the 2007-2010 crisis. In section 3 I discuss their effectiveness. The impact
of unconventional monetary polices on long-term inflation expectations is pre-
sented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
8.2. UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES IN THE US 
DURING THE 2007-2010 CRISIS
Unconventional policies implemented by the Federal Reserve during the 2007-
2010 crisis can be classified into five categories: interest rates commitment, long-
term Treasury bonds purchases, agency debt and MBS purchases, liquidity facil-
ities and rescue operations.
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8.2.1. Interest Rates Commitment
Under this class we consider statements through which the Federal Reserve
impact the expectation of the future federal funds rates. The economic situation
after the Lehman Brothers collapse was constantly worsening. Therefore, on
December 16, 2008 the FOMC cut the fed funds rate by three quarters of per-
centage point to 0.25%. This news surprised the markets as most participants
expected the half percentage cut. However, the FOMC statement released after
that meeting contained other surprising information. The release stated that “the
Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time”. On March 18,
2009 the FOMC made a stronger pledge announcing that the exceptionally low
levels of fed funds rate would be maintained “for an extended period” rather then
“for some time”. In this way, the Fed communicated to markets its commitment
to lower the path for future interest rates and therefore reduced long-term interest
rates. Expectations management has been proven effective in lowering long-term
interest rates during the deflation period in Japan (Ugai 2007). In fact, according
to New Keynesian models this kind of policy should stimulate the aggregate
demand even in the zero-bound environment as the current demand depends not
only on the current interest rate but also on the future expected short-term rates
and expected inflation.
8.2.2. Long-term Treasury Bonds Purchases
Another tool at the disposal of the central bank when the interest rates are close
to zero is the outright purchase of long-term government securities. The effective-
ness of this policy is based on the “portfolio rebalancing effect”. By purchasing
long-term securities, the central bank changes the composition of the portfolio of
securities left in hands of private sector and therefore affects their yields.
On December 16, 2008 the Federal Reserve announced that they were “evaluat-
ing the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities”. On Jan-
uary 28, 2009 they indicated that they were “prepared to purchase longer-term
Treasury securities if evolving circumstances indicate that such transactions
would be particularly effective in improving conditions in private credit mar-
kets”. On March 16, 2009 the FOMC decided to purchase up to 300 billion
dollars of longer-term Treasury securities over the following six months. This was
the first time the Fed tried to change the relative supply of the long-term Treasury
bonds since the “Operation Twist” in 1961.
Purchases of long-term bonds ended in October 2009 but were resumed the next
year. On August 10, 2010 the Fed announced that they would reinvest principal
payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities into longer-
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term Treasury securities. In addition to this reinvestment which represented from
$250 to $300 billion, the Fed announced on November 3, 2010 that they would
buy $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities. This second round of Treas-
ury bonds purchases was called Quantitative Easing 2.
8.2.3. Agency Debt and MBS Purchases
In addition to longer-term Treasury bonds, the Fed purchased also Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac debt and mortgage-backed securities. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac operated since 1968 as government sponsored enterprises (GSE). Their prin-
cipal activity consisted in expanding the secondary market in mortgages. They
were both privately owned but benefited from the “implicit” government guar-
antees which insured them favorable interest rates. In July 2008 Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae faced serious problems in meeting their obligations as the US housing
crisis worsened. In response to that, on Sunday July 13, 2008 the Secretary of the
Treasury announced that the US government would provide the backstop to GSE.
On September 7, 2008 the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) had put Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac under its conservatorship. Since the GSE were effec-
tively nationalized, their debt and MBS became close to Treasuries in terms of risk
profile2.
8.2.4. Liquidity Facilities
Since the beginning of the crisis, the Fed established several liquidity facilities in
order to restore the normal functioning of money markets. In December 2007,
they introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF) designed to auction term dis-
count window loans to depository institutions. After the collapse of Bear Stearns,
in March 2008 two facilities for primary dealers were launched: the Term Secu-
rities Lending Facility (TSLF) providing term loans of Treasury securities, and the
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) providing discount window loans. The
failure of Lehman Brothers was followed by creation in September 2008 of the
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
(AMLF) designed to support money market funds and the market for ABCP. In
October 2010, the Fed established the Money Market Investor Funding Facility
(MMIFF) designed to provide liquidity to US money market investors, and the
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) providing a liquidity backstop to US
issuers of commercial paper. Finally, in March 2009 in cooperation with the
Treasury the Fed launched the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)
intended to revive the market for ABS.
2 There exists an additional prepayment risk linked to MBS.
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The additional funding sources were meant to encourage banks and non-banking
institutions to lend more funds to each other and to bring down the borrowing
costs. With the central bank liquidity at their disposal, the financial institutions
have smaller incentive to hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons as they know
they would be able to meet the unanticipated liquidity needs. On the other hand,
the facilities should also bring down the default risk as the institutions’ counter-
parties would also benefit from the access to Fed’s liquidity backstop.
8.2.5. Federal Reserve’s Rescue Operations
During the crisis, the Fed rescued several financial institutions. Section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act allows the Fed to extend credit through discounts in
“unusual and exigent circumstances” when a borrower is “unable to secure ade-
quate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.” The main bene-
ficiaries were Bear Stearns and AIG but can be included in this category also the
loans granted to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the conversion of Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs into traditional bank holding companies.
8.3. EFFECTIVENESS OF UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY 
POLICIES
There exists an extensive literature which evaluates the effects of unconventional
monetary policies but the empirical evidence on this subject is yet not conclusive.
Before the 2007-2010 crisis, Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004) analyzed the
effectiveness of different unconventional monetary tools in lowering the long-
term interest rates in the United States and in Japan. In the United States they
consider the announcement of “debt buybacks” that followed the emergence of
budget surpluses in the late 1990s, the massive foreign official purchases of Treas-
ury securities during the period of Japan’s exchange-rate interventions and the
“deflation scare” episode of 2003. They also evaluate the zero interest rate policy
and the quantitative easing policy in Japan. Their empirical evidence confirms to
the large extent the effectiveness of non-standard policies in lowering long-term
interest rates in the United States. However, the impact of unconventional policies
implemented by the Bank of Japan is more ambiguous. Ugai (2007) surveyed the
empirical analyses which examine the effects of the unconventional monetary
policies implemented in Japan during the deflation period. According to the stud-
ies surveyed, the commitment effect lowers considerably the long-term interest
rates but the expansion in monetary base and the change in the composition of
the central bank balance sheet were found to have little impact or none at all.
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During the recent economic crisis unconventional monetary policies were exten-
sively implemented by many central banks. Since then, several descriptive (Borio
and Disyatat (2009), Meier (2009)) and theoretical (Adrian and Shin (2010),
Cùrdia and Woodford (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011)) studies contributed to
the better comprehension of non-standard monetary policies. The empirical
research focused on their impact on the reduction of interbank risk premia and
the reduction of long-term interest rates.
8.3.1. Libor-OIS Spread
Some of the unconventional monetary policies were designed to ease the tensions
on interbank market that appeared in August 2007 and intensified after the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers. Indeed, the generalized uncertainty concerning the
health of banks’ balance sheet made the banks unwilling to lend to each other. As
a consequence, the Libor-OIS spread which is considered as a barometer of inter-
bank market distress widened significantly3. This dramatic increase in the spread
(Figure 3) demonstrated that monetary policy lost its influence on interbank
credit conditions. To address this issue, the Fed implemented new liquidity facil-
ities.
Figure 3: 3-month Libor-OIS spread (%)
3 The London interbank offered rate (Libor), is an average interbank borrowing rate published daily by the
British Bankers’ Association (BBA). The overnight-indexed swap (OIS) rate represents market expectations of
the funds rate over the future months. There is no exchange of principal and only the net difference in interest
rates is paid at maturity, so there is very little default risk in the OIS market.
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There is a discussion in the recent literature concerning the effects of new liquidity
facilities on the Libor-OIS spread. Taylor and Williams (2009) claim the liquidity
facilities like TAF (Term Auction Facility) cannot have an impact on the Libor-
OIS spread because it is mostly due to credit risk and not the liquidity risk. On
the other hand, Wu (2008) maintains that the spread was caused by the misallo-
cation of liquidity and that the financial strains in the interbank money market
were alleviated after TAF was implemented. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009) consider all
macroeconomic and financial sector policy announcements in the United States,
the United Kingdom, the euro area and Japan and find that both macroeconomic
and financial sector policy announcements were associated with reductions in the
Libor-OIS spreads.
In Szczerbowicz (2011) I also consider the impact of all policy announcements
but take a different approach: regression-based event study, which allows to esti-
mate the effect of all policies simultaneously. First, I identify and classify uncon-
ventional monetary announcements made in the United States during the crisis
into five categories: interest rates commitment, long-term Treasury bonds pur-
chases, Agency debt and MBS purchases, liquidity facilities and the Federal
Reserve’s rescue operations (as described in section 2). Then, I use the regression-
based event study methodology to assess the impact of each type of policy on the
Libor-OIS spread. Under market rationality assumption, the effect of the policy
announcements should be reflected in asset prices over a short time period (two
days4). I rely on dummy variables to discriminate between days with or without
announcement. In line with the previous literature (Kuttner 2001) the financial
markets are assumed to react only to the announcements that were not fully antic-
ipated. The surprise component of dummy variables is defined based on informa-
tion included in specialized articles in Wall Street Journal and Reuters before and
after the event.
I find that announcements related to TAF do not affect the Libor-OIS spread but
those related to other liquidity facilities (TSLF, PDCF, AMLF, CPFF, MMIFF,
AMLF) reduce the spread by 9 basis points. The facilities associated with a reduc-
tion in counter-party risk seem to have bigger impact on the OIS-Libor spread
than measures aimed just at providing liquidity.
8.3.2. Long-Term Interest Rates
When the official rate is close to zero, the central bank can still stimulate the
economy by reducing long-term interest rates. Long-term rates are the fundamen-
4 There is a timing issue related to using this measure in the event study. The Libor rate is published at 06:00
Eastern Time while the OIS rate is taken from Datastream and the last update is from 14:15 Eastern Time. In
order to ensure that the markets had the possibility to incorporate the announcements I considered 2-day event
window.
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tal variable from the economic and financial point of view. They have an impor-
tant effect on durable goods expenditures, especially business investment. From
the finance perspective they are crucial determinants of mortgage prices, deriva-
tives and other long-term financial assets. Therefore, the goal of some of uncon-
ventional policies was not to lower short-term rates but to influence long-term
interest rates. In particular, purchases of longer-term Treasury bonds and agency
securities directly aimed at diminishing long-term yields5.
The impact of the Fed’s long-term debt purchases within Quantitative Easing 1
(QE1) on long-term interest rates was analyzed by Hamilton and Wu (2010) and
Gagnon et al. (2010). They found that QE1 indeed lowered nominal long-term
interest rates. In Szczerbowicz (2011) I contribute to the discussion on the effec-
tiveness of this unconventional policy via regression-based event study. In addi-
tion to studying the effects of QE1, I also measure the impact of Quantitative
Easing 2 (QE2) and other unconventional monetary policies discussed in sec-
tion 2. As previously described, the effect of each policy is captured around rele-
vant monetary policy announcements over short period of time (1 day). As Ham-
ilton and Wu (2010) and Gagnon et al. (2010) I find that QE1 reduced long-term
interest rates. Indeed, the purchases of longer-term Treasuries lowered the ten-
year interest rates by 22 basis points and the purchases of long-term Agency debt
and MBS reduced it by 17 basis points. Nevertheless, I find evidence that unlike
QE1, QE2 did not significantly lowered nominal long-term rates.
Interest rates commitment is another unconventional monetary policy that was
intended to lower long-term interest rates. In December 2008, the FOMC’s stated
that it would maintain the federal funds rate at “exceptionally low levels” for
“extended period of time”. The expectation theory says that long-term interest
rates equal an average of current and expected future short-term interest rates.
Therefore, the Fed’s commitment to lower the path for future interest rates was
supposed to reduce long-term interest rates. Empirical analyses on the Japanese
experience during the deflation period show that this kind of “expectation man-
agement” strategy was effective6. However, Gagnon et al. (2010) and Szczerbo-
wicz (2011) find that signaling a commitment to keep policy rates low for an
“extended period of time” did not contribute to reducing long-term interest rates
in the United States during the 2007-2010 crisis.
5 Chairman Ben Bernanke stated in his speech on December 1, 2008 that the Fed’s purchases of longer-term
Treasury or agency securities on the open market “might influence the yields on these securities, thus helping
to spur aggregate demand.” BERNANKE, 2008.
6 UGAI, 2007 and BERNANKE, REINHART and SACK, 2004.
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8.4. UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES AND 
LONG-TERM INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
While the impact of alternative monetary policies on money market distress and
long-term interest rates was largely discussed in the previous literature, their
effect on long-run inflation expectations is still poorly known. As we mentioned
earlier, some of the Fed’s unconventional measures were perceived as inflationary
by the markets. The liquidity facilities were intended to be short-term but there
was still inflationary risk related to them. The markets feared that the huge
amounts of liquidity put on the markets could not be easily absorbed once the
crisis would be over. The risk linked to longer-term Treasuries purchases was
twofold. They were followed by an important expansion of the overall size of the
Fed’s balance sheet and they changed the maturity structure of the Treasury debt
held by the Fed. By preferring the longer-term debt, the Fed took some risk on its
balance sheet as the price of long-term bonds fluctuates with time. The outright
purchases of agency debt and MBS and lending directly to specific financial insti-
tutions (Bear Stearns or AIG) were also perceived as risky. These assets were
meant to stay on the Fed’s balance sheet for long time7. Market participants were
worried that the Fed would not be able to sell them at the desired price. The
eventual Fed’s losses would be covered either with the help of the Treasury (dona-
tion of Treasuries for example) or by printing money if the cooperation of Treas-
ury would not be possible. The Fed’s losses would also have consequences on the
Treasury’s budget and might incite the government and the Congress to make
pressures on the Fed, which in turn could compromise the Fed’s independence
and credibility.
In order to measure the inflationary impact of the unconventional monetary pol-
icies described in section 2 I test the response of long-term inflation expectations
over short periods surrounding unconventional monetary announcements
(Szczerbowicz (2011)). Following Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2010) I use
the measure of inflation expectations extracted from financial markets, and in
particular the daily data on forward inflation compensation from 9 to 10 years
ahead. Inflation compensation rates are obtained by comparing nominal bonds
yields to inflation-linked bonds (break-even inflation rates). The one-year far-
ahead forward rates provide cleaner indication of long-horizon inflation expecta-
tions as they filter out the effects of short-term expectations8. Figure 4 shows 1-
year forward inflation compensation from 9 to 10 years ahead. The series has
been changing over time and became particularly volatile in autumn 2008. In the
beginning of 2009 it returns to its usual volatility. In January 2010 it starts declin-
7 BERNANKE, 2010.
8 Break-even inflation rates also incorporate liquidity and inflation premia. See SZCZERBOWICZ, 2011, for
detailed explanation on why this measure is still informative about long-term inflation expectations during the
crisis.
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ing but the trend reverses in August 2010 which coincides with the beginning of
Quantitative Easing 2.
Figure 4: 1-year inflation compensation ending in 10 years (%)
As in the case of Libor-OIS spread and long-term nominal rates I employ the
regression-based event study to measure the effects of unconventional monetary
measures on long-term inflation expectations. It results that news related to Fed’s
rescue operations increases far-ahead forward inflation compensation by 5 basis
points. Purchases of longer-term Treasury bonds within QE2 raise long-term
inflation expectations by 6 basis points. However, announcements related to QE1
and other unconventional monetary policies do not have significant impact on
long-term inflation compensation.
8.5. CONCLUSIONS
The implementation of unconventional monetary policies required the huge
expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and the change of its composi-
tion. These policies proved effective in many ways. The liquidity facilities, espe-
cially those associated with the reduction of counter-party risk, helped reduce
strains on the interbank markets. Purchasing long-term Treasury debt and
Agency debt and MBS within Quantitative Easing 1 lowered long-term nominal
interest rates. However, the second round of quantitative easing (QE2) did not
have the same effect. Also, the interest rates commitment was not found to have
lowering impact on long-term interest rates.
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Furthermore, the Fed’s rescue operations and Quantitative Easing 2 raised long-
term inflation expectations. This result provides evidence that QE1 and QE2 had
different effects: QE1 lowered nominal long-term interest rates without affecting
long-term inflation expectations while QE2 raised long-term inflation expecta-
tions and did not reduce nominal long-term interest rates. However, QE2 was
also effective in stimulating the economy. By raising long-term inflation expecta-
tions without raising long-term nominal rates it put downward pressure on long-
term real interest rates which are more relevant for spurring the aggregate
demand.
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